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PARODY AND PERCEPTION: USING
COGNITIVE RESEARCH TO EXPAND
FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT
LAURA R. BRADFORD *
Abstract: This Article draws on cognitive research to examine a conflict
within copyright doctrine. Scholars typically analyze unauthorized secon-
dary use of expressive works using an economic or a free speech analysis.
The former views copyrighted works primarily as products, the latter
primarily as speech. Both paradigms focus on the person doing the
speaking or distributing. Copyrighted works, however, protect commu-
nication between two parties, which involves both expression and un-
derstanding of that expression. This Article argues that because copyright
is a right to control certain types of information, how we process informa-
tion is relevant in determining copyright's scope. By incorporating
lessons from cognitive research on memory, attention, and preference,
courts can formulate rules that better balance the rights of owners with
the needs of consumers and new users for open engagement with
expressive works. More generally, a cognitive approach to secondary use
refocuses the debate from a question of what users intend to what
audiences require in choosing and consuming such works. This focus is in
keeping with copyright's goal of promoting innovation to further the
public good.
INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 2004, Little, Brown and Company ("Little Brown")
published Yiddish with Dick and Jane. As in the original, Dick and Jane
teach basic language skills, except that in this version they are adults,
the words are Yiddish, and they live in a suburban neighborhood rife
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with adultery and drug use. Pearson, the publisher of the original
Dick and Jane books, has not expressed interest in licensing a Yiddish
version. But in January 2005 Pearson sued Little Brown for, among
other things, copyright infringement because the new portrayal of
Dick and Jane is unsuited for association with the first grade reading
primer and the nostalgic memories it inspires.' Given that a Fun with
Dick and Jane movie is scheduled for release in December 2005, Pear-
son would rather not alienate its potential audience. 2 Little Brown,
publisher of the Yiddish version, claims the book is social commen-
tary entitled to First Amendment protection. 3
Pearson's real concern is for the perception of its characters
among consumers and this Article closely examines such claims. Some
might argue that concern about consumer reactions does not belong
within copyright law. Trademark law, with its prohibitions against
blurring and tarnishment of symbols, might seem better suited to
these issues and many plaintiffs, including Pearson, file suit under
both theories. Copyright law, however, also looks to consumer percep-
tions to set boundaries around protected works and determine what
unauthorized uses qualify as "fair."
Reliance on consumer reactions is pervasive in copyright law.
Modern copyright law forbids use not only of exact text, but also of
any communication audiences recognize as "substantially similar" or
obviously derived from an original. Infringement exists whenever an
ordinary observer would conclude that the defendant has incorpo-
rated something of substance and value from the plaintiffs work, re-
gardless of whether audiences would mistake the second work for the
former. 4
 New uses are "fair" only to the extent they do not adversely
' Complaint at 13 17, 33, 34, Pearson Educ. Inc. v. Little Brown & Co., No. 2:05 CV
00033 CBM (C.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2005).
2 Id. 1  30; see also Edward Wyatt, Primer Spoof with Yiddish Faces Suit (in English), N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 2005, at B7.
s Wyatt, supra note 2, at B7.
4 See, e.g., Incredible Techs., Inc., v. Virtual Techs., Inc., 400 F.3d 1007, 1011 (7th Cir.
2005) (describing the "ordinary observer" test in the context of video games as "'whether
the accused work is so similar to the plaintiff's work that an ordinary reasonable person
would conclude that the defendant unlawfully appropriated the plaintiff's protectible ex-
pression by taking material of substance and value.'"); infra notes 179-83 and accompany-
ing text. It is worth noting that general exceptions such as the merger doctrine and scenes
a faire exist. The scenes a faire doctrine exempts stock scenes and incidents that are com-
mon to certain genres or themes, such as car chases in police movies or depictions of kill-
ing in vampire stories, from being claimed by any one party. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER &
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[8] [4] at 13-78.6 to -78.7 (perm. ed., rev.
vol. 2005). The merger doctrine states that when an idea and its expression have become
synonymous, so that there is no other way to express the idea, the expression itself is un-
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affect the market or "value" of the original—a test that asks courts to
consider consumer appeal and demand.' Such amorphous tests al-
ready grant owners control over most public representations of their
works, regardless of whether one thinks copyright law should extend
to issues of consumer perception. Accordingly, as court decisions have
narrowed trademark dilution protection, producers can increasingly
rely on copyright's broader provisions to protect songs, characters,
images, and texts against dilution of meaning and value in the face of
imaginative reworkings of popular fare, or "secondary use."'
Pearson's complaint echoes the typical claim for such broad
copyright protection: that if courts allow too much secondary use of
expressive works without the owner's permission, the original works
themselves will be degraded and overexploited.? Owners of expressive
works claim loss of control over the presentation of a work, be it an
image, film, character, or song, has the potential to destroy the pub-
lic's positive associations with the original and so exhaust the demand
for the original and its attendant products. Such use also allows new
users to "free-ride" on the owner's investments in building an audi-
ence for the original work.'
This harm is typically analogized to the problem of "overgrazing"
in natural resource law.' This paradigm suggests that those with
protected. Id. § 13.03 f B)f31 (listing as examples a label depicting a piece of fruit or a map
showing the location of a proposed pipeline). These general doctrines, however, do not
speak to situations like the dispute between Pearson and Little Brown over the Dick and
Jane books, where a second author purposefully uses specific and well-known properties to
make a distinct expressive point.
5 17 U .S.C.§ 107(4) (2000); see also infra notes 251-52 and accompanying text.
6 See, e.g., Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2003) (stating that ac-
tion for trademark dilution requires proof of actual harm rather than just a likelihood of
dilution"); TCPIP Holding Co., Inc. v. Haar Commc'ns, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 98 (2d Cir. 2001)
(finding famous marks eligible for dilution protection must be both inherently distinctive
and have acquired significant distinctiveness among consumers).
7 See, e.g., Justin Hughes, "Recoding" Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience Interests,
77 Ti x. L. REV. 923, 927 (1999) (arguing that most audience members prefer stability in
the identity of cultural objects); Alex Kozinski, Mickey & Me, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS
L. REV. 465, 469 (1994); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable
Copyright, 70 U. Cut. L. REV. 471, 487-88 (2003) (arguing for perpetually renewable copy-
right to prevent overuse that prematurely exhausts commercial value).
a See Lawrence Lessig, Re-Marking the Progress in Frischmann, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1031,
1034 (2005) (describing copyright as preventing free-riding by competitors); Richard A.
Posner, When is Parody Fair User, 21 J. LEGAL &mu. 67, 72 (1992) (arguing that allowing
free use of older works redirects resources to copying and reuse, leading to under-
investment in production).
9 See Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 907, 918-19 (2004)
(stating that overgrazing can occur even with nonrivalrous goods such as songs and theo-
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shared access to a resource have no incentive to maintain its value and
so will overuse it until depletion.l° Only a private right to exclude
others will solve this "tragedy of the commons."
Academic critiques of using an overgrazing doctrine for intellec-
tual property are widespread. Critics claim that copyright's purpose of
encouraging investment in creative works does not require control
over all manifestations of that work after creation." It is unclear to
what extent multiple versions harm or degrade the audience's ability
to connect with the original, thereby altering incentives to produce
creative works." Increasingly, First Amendment scholars and audience
members resent that any one person should own the right to commu-
nicate alternative conceptions of an expressive work."
These critiques recognize that the problem with importing an
overgrazing doctrine into copyright is that expressive property does
not behave exactly like real property. Where real property gives own-
ers rights to a demarcated piece of ground, the precise boundaries of
a right to tell a story or perform a song are difficult to measure. Un-
like rights in tangible objects, copyright grants rights in something
more ephemeral: information and communication.
Digital technology exacerbates the tension between audience and
owner in two ways. First, it facilitates copying, alteration, and distribu-
tion of copyrighted works. Second, it makes tangible informal com-
munication and social interaction through email, websites and other
forms of electronic communication, and so pulls relatively private
speech into the reach of the copyright laws."
While rejection of overgrazing might be fashionable in academia,
courts have endeavored to find a middle ground. Through use of a
"parody" test, courts seek to allow important critical speech to reach the
marketplace, but prevent free-riding or use of old works to get atten-
ries); Landes & Posner, supra note 7, at 485 ("Recognition of an overgrazing problem in
copyrightable works has lagged.").
1° See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sct. 1243, 1244 (1968) (analyzing
the environmental problems posed by overpopulation in light of the overgrazing model).
11 See Mark Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI.
L. REV. 129, 143-46 (2004) (hereinafter Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post]; Mark A Lemley,
Property, Intellectual Property and Frec-Riding 32 n.100 (Stanford Law Sch. John M. Olin Pro-
gram in Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 291, 2004) [hereinafter Lemley, Free-Riding],
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=582602.
12 Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post, supra note 11, at 145-46.
13 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 1-48 (2004); infra text accompanying notes
101-19.
14 For further discussion, see text accompanying notes 200-02. See also LESSIG, supra
note 13, at 8.
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tion for unrelated works. 15 This test allows speech directly commenting
on previous work to use the previous work free of charge. If the second
work uses the older work for attention, or to satirize society in general,
the second user must get permission or risk injunction. 10 The difficulty,
however, of locating a precise point of view in ambiguous creative works
creates an uncertain standard that chills potential speakers and dis-
courages investment in satirical works. Small-scale users are especially
disadvantaged because they generally lack the resources to bargain for
licenses or defend potential lawsuits."
This Article argues that by paying attention to the significant
body of research about how people process and use information,
courts can formulate more tailored rules regarding use and reuse of
informational products, specifically cultural works such as books, mov-
ies, characters, and songs. Because copyright is a right to control the
flow of certain types of information, how we process information is
relevant in determining copyright's scope. Other areas of intellectual
property law, such as trademark, implicitly recognize that rights in
information depend on not only the content of the information but
also its effect on the recipient. Only uses that cause consumer confu-
sion or demonstrably alter consumer perception are actionable in
trademark. Recognition of similar substantive limitations in copyright
law has lagged.
By acknowledging the dynamic properties of information as op-
posed to viewing it as a tangible entitlement, we can locate a more
exact balance between the rights of owners and the needs of users
and consumers for diverse and open engagement with expressive
works. Cognitive research on memory, attention, and preference sug-
gests that, as a practical matter, we should provide more leeway to
secondary uses of expressive works that exhibit characteristics such as
clear source information and audience opt-in distribution methods.
As a normative matter, cognitive research indicates that we should be
concerned about the consumer's ability to choose between competing
interpretations of a work, not the owner's authority to control public
15 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,592-94 (1994).
15 See infra notes 66-68,257-60, and accompanying text.
See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV,
1536,1564-67 (2005). Such users are also disadvantaged by the considerable administra-
tive burden of locating copyright owners for older works. This burden has grown steeper
in recent years because copyright's extended term means that original authors may be
long-dead and heirs and transferees scattered or forgotten. In addition, notice, registra-
tion, and periodic renewal, which ensured information about copyright owners remained
publicly available, are no longer required for copyright protection.
710	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 46:705
perception. This approach conserves the owner's incentive to invest
in authorized reproductions while allowing greater participation by
outsiders in reforming, debating, and refining the work. 18
In other areas of the law, research from cognitive and behavioral
psychology has provided insights on how to distribute resources
efficiently and to resolve private disputes. Studies of human percep-
tion and decision-making faculties have been used to reframe debates
about tort remedies and contract formation. 19 In property law, ac-
knowledgement of decision-making biases has prompted re-
examination of the idea that broad, well-defined property rights facili-
tate rational and efficient market exchanges." As the nature of prop-
erty grows more intangible and the nature of ownership more diffuse,
scholars are looking at how common cognitive biases and processes
impact the optimal allocation of entitlement rights in a variety of set-
tings. 2t To date, however, the cognitive components of certain forms
of intellectual property such as copyright, trademark, or rights of pub-
licity have received little to no academic attention. This void is curious
given that the boundaries of the entitlements themselves reference
human perception. 22
With respect to copyright in particular, attention to cognitive psy-
chology and consumer research can provide more tailored rules for
secondary use. Copyright's purpose is to enrich the public by encourag-
18 See Lemley, Free-Riding, supra note 11, at 43, 47-48 (stating that copyright protection
should extend only as far as necessary to reward authors and spur future creation; surplus
value should be enjoyed by the public).
19 See generally BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass Sunstein ed., 2000); Pierre
Schlag, Missing Pieces: A Cognitive Approach to Law, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1195 (1989) (examining
competing fields of legal scholarship from a cognitive perspective).
20 See, e.g., Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance Cases Bargain After Judgment? A
Glimpse Inside the Cathedral, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 19, at 302;
Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Goose Theorem, in
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 19, at 211.
21
 For example, several scholars have argued that governance rules of corporate or-
ganizations should be adjusted to account for common group behaviors and communica-
tion strategies. See Marleen A. O'Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1241, 1294-1315 (2003). Sec generally Donald C. Langevoort, The Human
Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and
Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797 (2001). Others have argued that because default rules inevi-
tably shape preferences, legal frameworks should attempt to guide consumers and indi-
viduals toward welfare-maximizing choices. See, e.g., Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Objectiv-
ity of Well-being and the Objectives of Property Law, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669 (2003); Cass R.
Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. Cm. L. REv.
1159 (2003).
" See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000) (reserving to authors the right to produce tangible ob-
jects or performances in which their work may be perceived).
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ing the production of creative works. 23 The public is best served by en-
couraging greater numbers of innovative uses until such uses distort
consumers' ability to identify and choose between works. 24 Such an ap-
proach removes the emphasis on the motives of the secondary user, as
under the current fair use test, and focuses instead on the needs of the
consumer. Well-established doctrines from social cognition research
indicate that we can better distinguish between the types of secondary
uses that undermine consumer choice and those that do not.
Four doctrines from cognitive science—attitude resistance, source
effects, frequency effects, and hierarchy of processing research— pro-
vide an illustration. Taken together they suggest that certain uses of
copyrighted materials are unlikely to harm materially an owner's in-
vestment in, or a consumer's ability to, distinguish a specific message
or identity in a given informational work. Recognition of such infor-
mation processing, effects would allow more leeway for secondary use
that exhibits characteristics such as clear source information and audi-
ence opt-in distribution methods. Such doctrines also suggest more
freedom for secondary use of older rather than newer works. To offer
two simple examples, a literary parody of Dick and Jane, clearly
marked as such and available only to willing purchasers, does not seem
likely to do much harm to the general public's ability to recognize
authorized versions of the characters. By contrast, a ubiquitous televi-
sion commercial using Dick and Jane to promote Viagra may uncon-
sciously distort audience memory and attitude. Such distortions un-
duly interfere with the owner's ability to build an audience for a
communicative good. Under the current parody regime, determina-
tion of whether a given use is fair can only be made after distribution
and the filing of a lawsuit. The guidelines outlined above could facili-
tate the creation of more definitive safe harbors for certain derivative
uses within fair use and so obviate the need for a separate fair use
category for "parody."
Part I of this Article looks at economic and free speech accounts
of secondary use and shows how each omits consideration of elements
25 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432 (1984) (stat-
ing that the ultimate aim and sole interest of the Copyright Act is to stimulate artistic crea-
tivity for the public good); accord Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151,
156 (1975). But see Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003) ("[C]opyright law
serves public ends by providing individuals with an incentive to pursue private ones.").
24 See Aiken, 422 U.S. at 156 ("Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but pri-
vate motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of
literature, music, and the other arts.").
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that are important to consumers. 25 Part II explains the reasons why a
cognitive analysis is relevant to copyright law.26 It traces the historical
development of copyright from a right to reproduce tangible objects
to a right of conceptual representation and shows how contemporary
debates over branding and reuse stem from this expansion 27 Part HI
introduces a new standard for secondary use based on cognitive prin-
ciples that could replace, or at least augment, the current problematic
parody analysis. 28
First, however, an important word about the vocabulary within
this Article. Cognitive psychology refers to the study of how people
process and remember information. 29 Related areas in social cognitive
research examine how the processing of information affects attitudes
and preferences." At the risk of muddying the social science waters, I
use the term "cognitive research" to refer to both areas of scientific
study. I also draw on behavioral and ethnographic research about
marketing and consumer preference, using the umbrella label "con-
sumer research" to refer to this body of knowledge.
I. PREVAILING ACCOUNTS OF SECONDARY USE:
TRESPASS AND FREE SPEECH
A. The Economic Account of Expressive Property
The prevailing account of copyright and secondary use treats ex-
pressive property like real property. This framework, drawn from Law
and Economics scholarship, emphasizes the importance of private
ownership as the solution to "the tragedy of the commons" problem.
In this view, common ownership of resources is inefficient because
each individual stakeholder has little incentive to maintain or improve
the resource but instead will overuse it. Private ownership, on the
other hand, provides incentives to improve and maintain the property
and allows for full internalization of the costs of different choices.
25 See infra notes 31-131 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 132-321 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 132-270 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 322-71 and accompanying text.
29 Set MICHAEL W. EYSENCK, PRINCIPLES OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 1 (1993); GREGORY
ROBINSON-RIEGLER & BRIDGET ROBINSON-RIEGLER, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 2 (2004). But
see DIANE GILLESPIE, TIM MIND'S WE 22-23 (1992) (arguing for expansion beyond the in-
formation-processing focus of cognitive science to consider context and social interpretation
as part of perception).
S CC ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLES (1999).
2005]	 Parody and Perception	 713
Applying this analysis to intellectual property frames all unauthorized
secondary users as trespassers and their secondary works as stealing."
The problem with this analysis is that real property insights based on
the behavior of farmers in pastures are of limited use in an intangible
format grounded in human perception. 32
Under the tragedy of the commons model, in the absence of pri-
vate property rights, users will overexploit a pasture because, without a
guarantee that the pasture will be properly managed over time, each
individual user's best interest is to "overgraze" or take as much grass as
possible for their herd.33 The same insight has been made about hunt-
ing; where no one controls the ability of others to hunt, no one has in-
centive to increase or maintain the stock of game. 34 In either case, the
richness of the soil or the stock of game will quickly diminish.
Private ownership, by contrast, allows for consideration of the
costs and benefits of different uses of a resource." Owners will allo-
cate rights to the land to maximize its value and increase their own
wealth or happiness." Private ownership will induce investment in
improving the property because owners know they will be able to cap-
ture the return on their investment."
Concentrated ownership of land also lowers the transaction costs
of private agreements. Where ownership is concentrated, outside par-
ties may easily contract for any beneficial use of the property." The
identity of the initial owner matters little then; in an efficient market
with low transaction costs, the owner will sell or license rights to the
party who will put the parcel to its highest and best use." The eco-
nomic approach presumes that consensual market transfers ordinarily
" Sec Posner, supra note 8, at 67, 72.
92 Others have criticized the tendency to draw direct analogies between real and in-
tangible property. See, e.g., Lemley, Free-Riding, supra note 11, at 2-3; William F. Patry &
Richard A. Posner, Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of Eldred, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1639,
1643 (2004). These critiques focus on the differences between real and intangible prop-
erty from an economic perspective. I also am interested in these differences, but in this
Article I explore additional perspectives beyond economics to describe the properties of
intangible goods.
33 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. ECON. REV. 347, 354
(1967); Landes & Posner, supra note 7, at 484.
34 Demsetz, supra note 33, at 351.
38 Sce id. at 348.
38 /d. at 355.
37 Sec id. at 356.
38 Id. at 357.
38 Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3,11. & ECON. 1, 7, 11 (1960).
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are the most effective way to distribute resources; departures from this
norm in the form of legal regulation bear a heavy burden of proof. 4°
Scholars apply the tragedy of the commons model broadly with
the aim of creating rules that stretch across different types of entitle-
ments. They do so on the theory that a property doctrine that applies
universally promotes certainty in contracting and lowers information
costs for businesses. 0 Legal exceptions to broad property regimes
frustrate competition and promote rent-seeking behavior among in-
terest groups. 42
According to this unified theory, incentives operate similarly with
intellectual entitlements, such as copyrights, trademarks, and the
right of publicity, as they do with tangible property. 43 Private owner-
ship creates rewards for producing expressive property." The right to
exclude others from free-riding on this effort creates incentives to
maintain and invest in creation and spurs further creative efforts. 45
Owners of intangible rights will choose licensing and distribution ar-
rangements that will maximize the value of the right. 46 In a costless
E' See Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 2655, 2655, 2662 (1994) [hereinafter Merges, Of Property Rules]; Robert P. Merges, Are
You Making Fun of Met: Notes on Market Failure and the Parody Defense in Copyright, 21 AIPLA
Q.J. 305, 306-07 (1993) [hereinafter Merges, Are You Making Fun of Me] (summarizing the
economic view but arguing for greater flexibility in the case of parody in copyright law).
41 See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283,
314 (1996) (noting the preference of neoclassicist property theory for general property
rules that facilitate allocative efficiency); cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace Versus Property
Law?, 4 Tex. REV. L. & Pot.. 103, 107-08 (1999) (describing general property regimes as
"contract-enabling" because they foster competition across regimes and discourage rent-
seeking by private interest groups).
42 Easterbrook, supra note 41, at 107-08.
43 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 108, 112 (1990) ("[A] right to exclude in intellectual property is no different
in principle from the right to exclude in physical property."); Landes & Posner, supra note
7, at 484; sec also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003) (stating that the eco-
nomic philosophy behind the Copyright Clause is to provide material incentives to indi-
viduals to produce works of knowledge).
44
 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212 n.18.
43
 See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18J. LEGAL STULL 325 (1989).
46
 See, e.g., William M. Landes, Copyright, Borrowed Images, and Appropriation Art: An Eco-
nomic Approach, 9 Geo. MASON L. REV. 1, 6 (2000); Merges, Are You Malting Fun of Met, su-
pra note 40, at 306 ("[C]onsensual market transfers are the most effective way to simulta-
neously pursue the twin goals of incentive and dissemination."); Posner, Parody, supra note
8, at 69 (stating that even where a potential derivative use of copyright is better or more
valuable, transaction costs will be minimized by concentrating ownership in a single pair of
hands).
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environment, owners will also choose the uses most beneficial to soci-
ety because it will be economically efficient to do so. 47
But what of overgrazing? Expressive property is intangible and so
may be less vulnerable to overuse than soil or hunting grounds. Fur-
ther, its consumption is "nonrivalrous."" Use of a book, movie, image,
or other form of commodified information does not impose a direct
cost on others using the same information." Expressive works may be
endlessly copied without diminishing the quality of the original. 50
Economic theorists maintain that intellectual property may none-
theless be vulnerable to overgrazing. For example, trademarks are
vulnerable to dilution when used even by non-competitors to describe
unrelated goods. 51 The use of "Gucci" on a diaper bag may lessen the
value of the mark by weakening its connection to luxury goods. 52
Similarly, commercial use of a celebrity's image in connection with a
variety of different products is likely to lessen the value of that celeb-
rity's endorsemen t. 53
Producers claim that the same effect appears in copyright. Mattel
polices unauthorized uses of its Barbie character to avoid its use in art
works or pop songs that might displease or disgust its target audience
of young girls and their mothers.54 As William Landes and Richard
Posner have noted, Disney actively manages its characters to avoid
overkill and audience confusion. 55 They observe:
47 Posner, supra note 8, at 73 (stating that in all but the case of direct criticism, the
market is best placed to make an efficient trade-off between the First Amendment value of
a parody and the cost to the social value of the original work); see also PAUL GOLDSTEIN,
COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY 178-79 (1994).
48 Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post, supra note 11, at 143.
49 Lemley, Free-Riding, supra note 11, at 25.
" Dennis S. Karjala, Statement of Copyright and Intellectual Property Law Professors in
Opposition to H.R. 604, H.R. 2589, and S. 505, "The Copyright Term Extension Act" 9 ( Jan.
28, 1998), http://homepages.law.asu.edu/%7Edkatjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/leg
roats/1998Scuement.hunl.
51 Landes & Posner, supra note 7, at 485.
' 2 Gucci Shops, Inc. v. R. H. Macy & Co., Inc., 446 F. Supp. 838, 839-40 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
53 Landes & Posner, supra note 45, at 362-63; Stuart Elliott, Critics Claim Multiple Deals
Risk Saturation, USA TODAY, Apr. 30, 1991, at 1B.
54 Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 796, 802 (9th Cir. 2003); Mat-
tel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2002) (suing in trademark); Mat-
tel, Inc. v. Pin, 229 F. Supp. 2d 315, 318-19 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
53 Landes & Posner, supra note 7, at 486 ("To avoid overkill, Disney manages its charac-
ter portfolio with care. It has hundreds of characters on its books, many of them just wait-
ing to be called out of retirement .... Disney practices good husbandry of its characters
and extends the life of its brands by not over-exposing them .... They avoid debasing the
currency.") (alteration in original).
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If ... anyone were free to incorporate the Mickey Mouse
character in a book, movie, song etc., the value of the char-
acter might plummet. Not only would the public rapidly tire
of Mickey Mouse, but his image would be blurred, as some
authors portrayed him as a Casanova, others as catmeat, oth-
ers as an animal-rights advocate, still others as the hen-
pecked husband of Minnie. 56
Without strong ownership rights, those seeking to exploit the value
created and maintained by a work's owners will exhaust the work's
potential without considering the cost of their actions to others or to
the work itself. 57
 Thus, economic theorists contend that the need of
owners of expressive property to exclude trespassers is as great for ex-
pressive works as it is for owners of pastureland or hunting grounds."
According to the economic account, the need to exclude may be
even greater with respect to expressive works because of the particular
dynamics of the media and entertainment industries. Many works of
authorship take years to create. The author thus incurs substantial
costs, at least in the form of opportunity costs. Publishers too must
decide whether to distribute a book before knowing whether it will
succeed. They commit huge sums in advance to distribution and mar-
keting, but only a very few expressive works earn back these initial in-
vestments. These blockbusters subsidize the creation and marketing
of all of the other works that never find an audience. Producers thus
need to recoup all of the social value of successful works to continue
to produce new works." Any free-riding on their investment will redi-
rect resources to copycats and secondary use, where creators can
make use of already successful works for free instead of engaging in
the risky business of creating works from scratch.°
These concerns underlie the claim that the list of exceptions al-
lowed for secondary use of expressive property should be narrow."
Economic scholars argue that fair use exemptions are justified mainly
in limited circumstances of market failure. 62
 For example, because few
56 Landes & Posner, supra note 7, at 487-88; see Hughes, supra note 7, at 926, 941-42.
57 Landes & Posner, supra note 7, at 484.
58 Id, at 485.
56 Id. at 495.
60 Posner, supra note 8, at 72.
61 Id.; Patry & Posner, supra note 32, at 1644.
62 See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 47, at 224, 230 (arguing that as technology reduces
transaction costs, the need for safety valves like fair use declines, but excepting limited
distributional goals such as education and research); Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use:
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owners will willingly submit their works to ridicule, private transac-
tions will fail to create a licensing market for parody.° Even if the so-
cial value of the parody is great, the transaction costs, here in the
form of the owner's reputational interests, are too high to permit
efficient functioning of the market." But to prevent rampant free-
riding under the guise of parody, economic theorists contend that the
parody exception should only apply where the original work is un-
questionably the target of the second author's criticism.°
By contrast, secondary users wishing to make use of a text as a
vehicle or "weapon" to criticize society generally should be able to
bargain for a license in the competitive market.° So long as such us-
ers pay a market price, the theory goes, owners will be happy to facili-
tate this wider dissemination of their products.° Therefore, users
need no fair use exception to remove market obstructions.68
The Supreme Court has embraced this framework in two land-
mark decisions governing secondary use. First, in 1985, in Haider &
Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation. Entetplises, the Court looked at whether
"the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material
without paying the customary price"—in other words, whether a
finding of fair use would preclude efficient market transactions—in
finding that publication of a small excerpt from a newly released presi-
dential memoir was not fair use.° Later, in 1994, in Campbell v. Acuff
Rose Music, Inc., which concerned a rap version of a famous fifties bal-
The Impact of Automated Rights Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. RI:v.
557, 583 (1998) (adopting a market failure theory of fair use); Trotter Hardy, Property (and
Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. Cut. LEGAL F. 217, 233; Edmund W. Kitch, Can the Internet
Shrink Fair Use?, 78 NEB. L. REV. 880, 881 (1999) (predicting that the Internet will enable
easy and efficient communication between users of copyrighted work and owners of copy-
righted works, which will reduce the market failure situations that justify the fair use doc-
trine); cf. Wendy J. Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits: Torts, Restitution, and Intellectual Property,
34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 541, 561-62 (2003) (arguing that exceptions from liability rules
should be limited to clear market failure, but preferring a damages rule over injunctive
relief in many cases). Wendy J. Gordon argued in an earlier piece for a purely economic
view of fair use, see Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 CoLum. L. REV. 1600, 1605 (1982), but
has since argued that creative expression serves important nonmonetary values as well.
63 See Posner, supra note 8, at 73-74.
61' Sce id.
65 Id. at 71; Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 209, 235 (1983).
66 Posner, supra note 8, at 71 (describing the purpose of many parodies as simple
amusement); see Goldstein, supra note 65, at 235.
67 See Posner, supra note 8, at 72-73; Goldstein, supra note 65, at 216.
68 See Posner, supra note 8, at 73.
69 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985).
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lad Pretty Woman, the Court limited the parody exception to cases of
direct commentary on a theory of market failure." The Court distin-
guished between works that use "elements of a prior author's composi-
tion to create a new one that, at least in part, comments on that
author's works" with those where the "commentary has no critical bear-
ing on the ... original composition, which the alleged infringer merely
uses to get attention of to avoid the drudgery in working up something
fresh ...."71 The Court reasoned that because creators of imaginative
works would never license critical lampoons of their own productions,
judicial intervention was necessary to further valuable social commen-
tary." Where the second work used the original to criticize something
else, the Court ruled it could "stand on its own two feet and so re-
quire(d] justification for the very act of borrowing."
This economic view of intellectual property is evident in more
recent decisions. In 2004, faced with the question of whether a sam-
pling of musical notes constituted infringement even if no one could
recognize the similarity, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Bridge-
port Music v. Dimension Films considered which result would lead to the
most efficient stewardship of musical recordings and ruled the sam-
pling to be infringement. 74 Continuing the analogy of copyright with
real property, the court stated even the borrowing of a small number
of musical notes should be analyzed as "a physical taking rather than
an intellectual one."75
The Bridgeport decision incorporates the common mistake that all
secondary use of copyrighted works is analogous to a physical trespass
70 510 U.S. 569. 580-81, 590-94 (1994).
71 Id. at 580.
72 See id. at 580-81.
75 Id. at 581.
74
 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390, 398-99 (6th Cir. 2004).
75 Id. The court's decision turned on the different treatment of "sound recordings"
and "musical compositions" in the Copyright Act. See id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (2000)
(stating that the owner of a copyrighted sound recording has the exclusive right "to pre-
pare a derivative work in which the actual sounds fixed in the sound recording are rear-
ranged, remixed, or otherwise altered in sequence or quality"). Because the Copyright Act
grants owners the exclusive right to "alter" sound recordings, the court concluded that the
substantial similarity test did not apply. Bridgeport Music, 383 F.3d at 398 11.8. It is not clear,
however, that the Copyright Act grants owners rights over alterations beyond recognition.
The court rejected the idea of a de minimus exception because of a disdain for free-riders;
it held that "even when a small part of a sound recording is sampled, the part taken is
something of value," even if the only value was to "save costs" for the secondary user. Id. at
399. Such an analysis ignores the distributional concerns underlying the fair use exception
without explaining how a de minimus exception would materially impact copyright's in-
centive functions.
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in real property. bright-line rules for real property create market
efficiency but differences between real estate and creative works alter
where those lines should be drawn with respect to creative works. Un-
til we understand what we mean to protect with copyright, we cannot
understand what constitutes a trespass of that right.
Insights about real property fail to allocate rights efficiently in
the case of intangible works in part because of differences in the na-
ture of the entitlement. The ability to unbundle rights to real estate is
generally well understood. Acknowledgment of the dynamics of real
property pervades the default rules around which parties license,
such as the liability rules for removal of subjacent support for exam-
ple, 79 With expressive property, these dynamics remain mysterious
and under dispute. On the one hand, consumption of expressive
goods is nonrivalrous. One's use of one copy of a text will not affect
another's ability to consume another copy. On the other hand, the
overgrazing paradigm suggests the opposite: that any secondary use of
a character, image, tune, or design affects the perception of the work
as a whole and so its market value. Individual members of ownership
entities tend to be risk-averse when confronting this uncertainty. The
prevailing wisdom in the entertainment industry favors uniformity of
message across uses of protected characters and narratives to prevent
expressive "overgrazing."77 Thus owners have a powerful disincentive
to license use of their properties to all but a narrow segment of goods
the owner identifies as complementary:78 This set of products is likely
to be much less than the set of potential products that audience
members might find valuable, useful, or interesting.
The scalability of information products, which enables them to
serve both massive and very small numbers of users, also prevents
beneficial private transactions. In a real property circumstance, the
tangible nature of the goods establishes a certain scale of potential uses.
Parties seeking licenses to and easements on a three-acre parcel tend to
be limited in number, easily identifiable, and represent a certain subset
of activities consistent with the character and size of the land. 79 Expres-
70 See Plans v. Sacramento N. Ry., 253 Cal. Rptr. 269, 271-72 (1988) (owner of subja-
cent support is absolutely liable for damages caused to surface owner by removal of the
natural necessary support; liability survives even after remover has sold the property).
77 See infra notes 207-41 and accompanying discussion.
7a See Guy Pessach, Copyright Law as a Silencing Restriction on Noninfringing Materials: Un-
veiling the Scope of Copyright's Diversity Externalities, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1067, 1089-90 (2003)
(arguing that economies of scale lead corporate media to produce homogenous content
and neglect minority tastes).
79 See Patry & Posner, supra note 32, at 1643.
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sive property by contrast is endlessly multipliable, may be distributed in
numerous formats, and appeals to both large and small-scale users si-
multaneously. The concentration of ownership in a single party reduces
transaction costs for large-scale licensees, but imposes additional bur-
dens on smaller users. Individual authors and small entities often lack
the information and resources necessary to engage in negotiations over
established properties. They do not belong to the proper networks, and
may not be sufficiently repeat players to invest in joining them. For ex-
ample, many large film studios will not accept story or product pitches
unless they come from an established agency or other known industry
channels. 80 In addition, the potential revenue from such licenses is so
small that it is usually not worth the owner's time to engage in negotia-
tions. Disney, for one, will not consider a new product line unless it has
the potential to become a billion-dollar revenue stream. 81 In this way,
the economic view tends to concentrate control over the dissemination
and social construction of expressive works in the hands of a few large
and conformist organizations.
Moreover, the ambiguity surrounding what exactly constitutes a
parody creates uncertain boundaries for innovation using older texts.
As discussed in Part II, the impulse to discuss and reinterpret popular
texts is ancient and widespread. 82 Examples may be found among the
plays of the ancient Greeks, 83 in parodies of early Jewish texts, 84 and in
Chaucer's Canter -bury Tales. 85 The Supreme Court's definition of parody
as something that targets a specific work is somewhat narrower than the
historical definition, which identifies parody as any work that adopts
eo Telephone Interview with Gabriel Scott, Public Affairs Officer, Writer's Guild West, (May
9, 2005); see also Hallmark Entertainment, Help, http://www.hallmarkent.com/help.php#20
(last visited Sept. 11, 2005).
81 See AI. LIEBERMAN & PATRICIA ESGATE, THE ENTERTAINMENT MARKETING REVOLU-
TION: BRINGING Tim MOGULS, THE MEDIA, AND THE MAGIC TO THE WORLD 5 (2002); infra
notes 132-321.
82
 Parody is a form of satire, in which prevailing vices or follies are held up to ridicule,
but is particular in that parody incorporates material from a target text as a constituent
part. MARGARET A. ROSE, PARODY: ANCIENT, MODERN & POST-MODERN 80-81 (1993).
85
 ARISTOPHANES, TIE COMPLETE PLAYS or AR1STOPHANES 13-51, 53-100, 367-415
(Moses Hadas ed., 1962) (ridiculing the styles of Aeschylus and Euripedes in the Knights,
the Frogs, and the Acharnians); ALBIN LESKY, A HISTORY OF GREEK LITERATURE 417 ( James
Willis & Cornelis de Heer trans., Thomas Y Crowell Co. 2d ed. 1963) (stating that Aristotle
named Hegemon of Thasos as the first writer of parodies, and mentioning Hegemon's
Gigantontachia, which parodied the Athenian military loss in Sicily); see also Leon R. Yank-
wich, Parody and Burlesque in the Law of Copyright, 33 Cr.AN BAR REV, 1130, 1133-34 (1955).
84 ROSE, supra note 82, at 120.
85 GEOFFREY CHAUCER, The Prologue and Tale of Sir Thopas, in CANTERBURY TALES 382-
90 (A.C. Cawley ed., Borzoi Books 1992) (1400).
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the style or substance of an original for comic effect or ridicule." Al-
though parody is a derivative art form, some scholars ascribe to it a
significant role in breaking down old forms and ushering in new styles.
At least one theorist gives it a dominant role in the creation of the
novel in Europe because parody accustomed audiences to works of
fiction in which the author's voice was concealed behind the voices of
others.87 Parody has also historically been a favorite device of young
authors as they try out different styles before developing their own. 88
The narrow exception for targeted criticism endangers this tradi-
tion. Judges applying the parody test struggle to isolate one prevailing
"message" from a complex expressive work." No case explains a cer-
tain process by which a judge should reach a conclusion about a
work's message, and whether that message "comments" on a previous
work, other than presumably by instinct and intuition." As Rebecca
Tushnet has pointed out, courts may be incapable of making such a
determination.81 To borrow her example, whether Warhol's paintings
of Campbell's soup cans "commented" on the cans or used them just
for attention is a question capable of intense debate with no satisfac-
tory answer. 92 The resulting uncertainty about the legal standard cou-
pled with the property remedy of injunction for violation chills poten-
tial speakers and discourages investment in satirical works."
Furthermore, by the time judges, who disproportionately repre-
sent a few limited segments of society, can perceive a parodic message,
the social flaw being exposed is generally well-understood. Judges
have tended to be more lenient to works that speak across well-known
86 RosE, supra note 82, at 81-82.
67 MIKHAIL MLICHAILOVICH BAKHTIN, THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION: FOUR ESSAYS 6, 309
(Michael Holquist ed., Caryl Emerson & Michael Holquist trans., Univ. of Tex. Press 1981);
see also ROSE, supra note 82, at 132.
88
 ROSE, supra note 82, at 30; See HAROLD BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE: A THE-
ORY OF POETRY 30 (1975),
89 See Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has in
Common with Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and Telecommunications Regula-
tion, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1, 13 (2000); Dianne Leenheer Zimmerman, Information as Speech,
Information as Goods: Some'Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 Wst. & MARY L.
REV. 665, 709 (1992) (describing how many cases are determined by the discretion and
sense of justice of each particular judge and jury due to the vagueness surrounding the
scope of property rights and its intersection with speech rights).
90 See Merges, Am You Making Fun of Me?, supra note 40, at 312.
Tushnet, supra note 89, at 13.
92 Id.
99 Id. at 20-21; sec Zimmerman, supra note 89, at 709.
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cultural divides, such as race or gender. 94
 Where a work speaks to less
obvious or well-accepted issues, such as intra-racial parodies or, in
some cases, works connected to homosexuality, judges have tended to
draw narrower lines around what constitutes a "comment." 95 Restrict-
ing the exception to critiques that are already well-accepted mini-
mizes its value. Such a cautious standard threatens the ability of satire
to illuminate unexamined tensions and only reinforces dominant
ways of thinking. It also values overtly critical works over more subtle
combinations of traditions."
In contrast to the economic school, more recent scholarship from
cognitive and behavioral psychology suggests that understanding both
the nature of the property subject and its social function is crucial to
determining the proper allocation of property rights 97
 Research dem-
onstrates that status quo bias acts as a powerful barrier to private trans-
actions involving resource entitlements. People tend to value resources
more highly if such resources have been initially allocated to them than
if those goods had been allocated somewhere else. 98 Therefore, people
are reluctant to part with resources that they own even if the transac-
tion would put the resource to a more valuable use. Such research puts
renewed emphasis on finding optimal default allocations to increase
94 See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 582-83; Walking Mountain, 353 F.3d at 802; Sun trust
Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1270-71 (11th Cir. 2001); sec also The Patry
Copyright 13log, http://williampatry.blogspot.com (Apr. 29, 2005, 6:29 EST).
9'3 Compare Campbell, 510 U.S. at 582-83 (finding a parody where a rap song indirectly
criticized earlier romanticized urban setting of song by a white artist), with Parks v. Laface
Records, 329 F.3d 437, 453-54 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding no parody under the Lanham Act
where rap group used the name of civil rights icon Rosa Parks in a song obliquely about
changing times and new black heroes). The divergent verdicts in Campbell and Parks v.
Laface Records seem to rest more on discomfort with interpreting intra-racial commentary
than actual differences between the "parodic messages" of the songs. Similarly, in the early
nineties, judges were reluctant to allow recoding of popular symbols by groups with homo-
sexual affiliation. See S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 540-
41 (1987) (forbidding use of label `Gay Olympic Games" for alternative sporting event de-
spite widespread use of the term Olympic(s) by other organizations unaffiliated with the
official games); MGM-Pathe Commc'ns, Co. v. Pink Panther Patrol, 774 F. Supp. 869, 877
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (enjoining use of the Pink Panther symbol by anti-gay violence patrols).
96 For example, the popular and critically acclaimed Grey Album, which combined
music from the Beatles' White Album and jay-Z's Black Album, was withdrawn under legal
challenge presumably because the work would not meet the legal definition of parody.
Electronic Frontier Foundation, Grey Tuesday: A Quick Overview of the Legal Terrain,
http://www.eff.org/1P/grey_tuesday.php (last visited Sept. 11, 2005).
97 See Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 21, at 1717-18, 1726 (reasoning objective value
judgments about property entitlements, based on the quality and identity of property at
issue, can create welfare-maximizing default rules); infra note 99.
99 See generally Daniel Kahneman et al„ Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the
Coase Theorem, 98J. Pot- EcoN. 1325 (1990).
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social welfare and private utility since allocations are likely to be given
legitimacy by recipients and so remain in place. Understanding how
the resource at issue operates and is valued by different stakeholders
enables the formulation of more effective default rules.99
B. Copyright Minimalists and the First Amendment Critique
Before turning to cognitive research, it is worth discussing the
primary critique of the economic property-based account of secon-
dary use. First Amendment scholars articulate a positive account of
First Amendment values to support the interests of audience members
in recoding popular works and fault the economic framework for fail-
ing to consider democratic values of free speech and autonomy. This
critique effectively identifies problems with the prevailing regime.
Since copyright restrictions generally trespass on First Amendment
freedoms,'" however, the First Amendment alone offers little guid-
ance in how to balance competing interests. Solutions rooted in free
speech discount the importance of a right to exclude for investment
in entertainment projects. Like the economic account, the free
speech critique imperfectly reflects the dynamics of the information
entitlements at issue.
The First Amendment critique focuses on the control that copy-
right gives to large media firms over development of and engagement
with culture. With the advent of mass media, many of the symbols and
narratives that permeate everyday life are commodified. 191 Think here
of the Star Wars movies, the Coca-Cola logo, and characters from
popular television shows such as Bart and Lisa Simpson. People find
fulfillment in using such conventional or widely understood symbols
to express their commitment to cultural, political, or social groups.'"
99 Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 21, at 1162 (arguing that because default rules inevi-
tably shape preferences, legal frameworks should attempt to guide consumers and indi-
viduals toward welfare-maximizing choices); cf. Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and
Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 674-75 (1998) (arguing that the status quo
bias demonstrates the desirability of tailoring default rules to specific circumstances).
100 See Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How the Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and
How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L. J. 535, 538 (2004).
101 Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property
Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 Tot. L. REV. 1853, 1863 (1991); see Rochelle Cooper Drey-
fuss, We Are Symbols and Inhabit Symbols, So Why Should We Be Paying Rent? Deconstructing the
Lanham Act and Rights of Publicity, 20 CoLum.-VLA J.L. & AR•S 123, 124 (1996) (stating that
Betty Crocker has replaced Hestia in the public consciousness).
102 JOHN PHILIP JONES & JAN SLATER, WHAT'S IN A NAME?: ADVERTISING AND THE
CONCEPT OF BRANDS 217-25 (2003) (describing Coca Cola brand loyalists who fanatically
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They comment on their surroundings through creative mixing of tra-
ditions and reworkings of popular culture.'" Even the decision to
copy verbatim someone else's speech may serve democratic values.
The assertion that someone's words are relevant to a new situation is a
particular political stance.'" Copyright law restricts "the social flow of
texts, photographs, music and ... other symbolic works," a form of
control that may deprive us of the optimal cultural conditions for
democratic debate and expressive innovation."
A similar critique may be found among scholars who view the
Internet and the new "networked society" as particularly fertile ground
to encourage active participation in culture and self-government.'"
The ease of digital transmission and reproduction enables users to
transform common symbols and texts for their own purposes, and so
"speak back" to more powerful entities. 1 °7 Networked communication
raises the potential for collaboration and decentralized production and
thus active engagement in the cultural sphere.'" This same digital
technology, however, also enables greater tracking, surveillance, and
blocking of expressive consumption.'" Use of expressive works leaves a
trail on the Internet. Owners seek to charge fees or enjoin unauthor-
ized viewing and distribution of works or derivatives. In this way, strong
intellectual property rights threaten to undermine the Internet's po-
tential to foster a true democratic culture.
To counteract these trends, scholars have put forward positive
theories of the First Amendment that would limit the amount of pro-
tection copyright owners may claim. For example, Neil Netanel has
argued that inherent in First Amendment values is a need for offer-
collect products bearing the company's logo because, as one collector says, "it's in every-
body's past ... [it is) the symbol of America"); Tushnet, supra note 89, at 16.
1" See Coombe, supra note 101, at 1864-66; Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright,
Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law, 17 Loy. L.A. ENT, L.J. 651, 678-79 (1997).
104 Tush net, SKPl'a. note 89, at 17.
1 " Coombe, supra note 101, at 1866.
1" See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 10-13 (2004) (arguing that the
Internet empowers consumers to become active participants in the production of public
culture); Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons: Toward a Political Economy of Information,
52 DUKE L.J. 1245, 1266 (2003).
107 See Balkin, supra note 106, at 33-34; Benkler, supra note 106, at 1266; Niva Elkin-
Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic Approach to Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14
CARDOZO Arts & ENT. L.J. 215, 233, 236 (1996).
t"8
	 Balkin, supra note 106, at 11-13, 33-34.
to See id. at 18.
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ings from "diverse and antagonistic" sources. 110 Yochai Benkler has
advanced a similar thesis, arguing that because the First Amendment
requires a robust public domain, it limits the rights in information
that may be granted to private entities." Jed Rubenfeld argues that
the First Amendment cabins copyright by protecting an absolute
"freedom of imagination." 112 No person should require permission to
exercise her imagination, nor should anyone be prevented from dis-
seminating works of her own imagination. 11S Rubenfeld thus takes is-
sue not with copyright's prohibition on reproduction, but on the de-
rivative works right that prevents unauthorized users from
reimagining cultural works. 114
These theorists agree that a positive theory of the First Amend-
ment would require a broadening of copyright's treatment of trans-
formative uses beyond the narrow allowance for targeted parody. 115
According to the free speech model, where a secondary work is
"transformative," that is, the author has added her own original ex-
pression along with the previous work to change its meaning or pur-
pose, 116 courts should not enjoin that speech. 117 As with other prior
restraints, the injunction of transformative works, which by definition
contain original expression, raises a specter of government-assisted
censorship. Such restrictions risk suppressing valuable thoughts and
ideas that would lose force if expressed another way. 118 As to claims
that unfettered secondary use will erode audience demand, minimal-
11 (1 Neil Weinstock Netanel, Market Hierarchy and Copyright in Our System of Free Expres-
sion, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1879, 1881 (2000) (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326
U.S. 1, 20 (1945)).
11 ' See Yochai Ben kler, Through the Looking Glass: Mice and the Constitutional Foundations
of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 187 (2003).
112 Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality, 112 YALE LJ.
1,4-5 (2002).
m Id. at 4.
I" Id. at 5.
115 See id.; see also Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Con-
straints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 357-58 (1999); Neil Wein-
stock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 84
(2001).
116 Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990).
117 See Netanel, supra note 115, at 84; Rubenfeld, supra note 112, at 53; Zimmerman,
supra note 89, at 737; see generally Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 Co-
mm. L. REV. 983 (1970); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech. and Injunc-
tions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 Duct L.J. 147 (1998).
118 See Tushnet, supra note 89, at 10-11.
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ists see such concerns as improperly safeguarding the moral value or
reputation of the work against criticism and comment.II 9
One problem is that the First Amendment, by itself, does not di-
rect how to choose between speakers.'" Some transformative uses are
still substitutive, such as the adaptation of a novel into a screenplay.
The screenplay author may add pages of new dialogue and invent new
characters; this is often the case even for authorized adaptations."'
The author may use quite a bit of imagination. But once that adapta-
tion is commercially released, it will satisfy much of the audience's
demand for a film version, thereby siphoning off a large chunk of the
owner's expected return. 122
Rubenfeld and Netanel would answer this dilemma by imposing a
compulsory license or profit apportionment scheme whereby a judge
or neutral tribunal calculates what portion of the second author's re-
turn is due to the appeal of the first creator's work. 123 Such a system
would separate the right to receive compensation for use from the
right to control what form the use takes. Assuming proper manage-
ment, a panel of experts potentially could arrive at a reasonable li-
censing fee. Furthermore, the shadow of government oversight would
likely encourage private bargaining.
However appealing, this system preserves the uncertainty of the
current doctrine and undermines copyright's incentive functions. It
preserves uncertainty because it entrusts judges to separate changes
that involve imagination from changes that are introduced only to
evade the reproduction right. This latter class would still be subject to
injunction. 124 This inquiry is arguably as subjective as asking if a new
work "comments" on an original.'"
119 Rubenfeld, supra note 112, at 53-54; Tushnet, supra note 103, at 675.
120 See David McGowan, Why the First Amendment Cannot Dictate Copyright Policy, 65 U.
PITT. L. Rev. 281,284-85,309-05 (2004).
121 See Goldstein, supra note 65, at 220-21.
122 For some commentators, this sort of piracy is worse than the literal kind because
the secondary user appropriates a new, untapped market, whereas if the infringing work
were limited to the same medium, it would only attract the same people who already had
the opportunity to purchase the plaintiff's work. NIMMEIt & NIMMElt, supra note 4,
§ 13.03[E] [2] at 13-92; cf. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 47, at 7 (asserting that publishers will
invest more in purchasing, marketing, and producing a work when they know they can
control all derivative uses).
125 See Netanel, supra note 41, at 380-81; Rubenfeld, supra note 112, at 57-58.
124 Rubenfeld, supra note 112, at 55.
125 See Michael Abramowitz, A Theory of the Derivative Right and Related Doctrines
42-44 (2005) (unpublished paper, on file with the author).
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The regime also undermines incentives because it does not ad-
dress overuse. Economics scholars argue that mass promotion of a
popular character may saturate the public's demand for that charac-
ter, especially if, as seems likely, many people will try to reimagine the
character into their own products at the same time. 126 While there
may be reasons to doubt that such effects are universal or widespread,
especially for well-known works, it is not clear that negative external-
ities should be discounted altogether. 127 As discussed further in Part
II, empirical data does suggest that in certain circumstances overex-
posure to expressive works can decrease audience demand by altering
the ability to recognize, understand or appreciate authorized ver-
sions. 128 While this is unlikely to deter amateur creators and low-
intensity investments in creative production, the risks of instant copy-
cats and quick market saturation may discourage sustained investment
in expressive works, 129 It is hard to see how such an environment
leaves audiences or owners better off. We would have solved the prob-
126 See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
127 Sec Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post, supra note 11, at 145-46. Professor Mark A. Lem.
ley has argued that copyright owners do not need a right to exclude secondary users be-
cause the problem of overgrazing, or congestion externalities, is self-limiting. He gives four
reasons for this claim. First, only a subset of works that are widely known across a culture
are likely to be "overgrazed." Id. at 145. Second, if consumers prefer the original context of
the work, demand will remain high for that version. Id. at 146. If consumers prefer the
rewrite, then we should examine our assumption that consumers prefer static meaning in
their cultural symbols. Id. Third, allowing competition to produce sequels and rewrites
may spur the original owner to produce a newer version faster. Id. Finally, the social value
of allowing subversion of icons outweighs the social good of protecting them. Id. at 145-
46. Although compelling on many counts, this account of overgrazing is firmly "ex post." It
assumes a world in which cultural icons already exist. Once control over many forms of
reproduction and reuse is removed, it maybe much harder to establish works with iconic,
consensus meanings across a culture. cf. Hughes, supra note 7, at 943, 960 (noting that in
the absence of intellectual property rights, use of a symbol such as Madonna's image could
mean something entirely different to someone in Oregon than it would in Venice Beach,
and eventually could become meaningless altogether). One should not go too far here
though. Complementary regimes such as trademark and unfair competition may prevent
some free-riding aside from copyright protection. Goldstein, supra note 65, at 220; F. Scott
Kieff, The Case Against Copyright: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of Intellectual Property
Regimes 7 (Stanford Law Sch. John M. Olin Program in Law and Econ., Working Paper No.
297, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=600802 . But see Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37-38 (2003) (holding that the Lanham Act does
not prevent unaccredited copying of copyrighted work in which the copyright has lapsed).
128 See infra notes 228-32, 396-53 and accompanying text.
129 Cf Abramowicz, supra note 125, at 28 (arguing that the purpose of derivative work
right is to prevent rent dissipation).
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lem of copyright cannibalizing free speech rights by allowing free
speech to cannibalize copyright."°
As Mark Lemley has argued, what is needed is an account of in-
centive and access issues that is specific to copyright law." 1
 Economic
property analysis and free speech doctrine are useful here, but both
neglect key aspects of how consumers actually choose and make use
of expressive works. The economic account neglects the importance
of communication and discussion about competing interpretations of
symbolic works. The minimalists ignore significant audience interests
in the ability to recognize and identify with cultural works. By paying
attention to research regarding how we understand and consume in-
formation, we can arrive at rules that more precisely balance free
speech and democracy interests with the stability and incentive func-
tions underlying audience choice.
II. AN
 INFORMATION-PROCESSING ACCOUNT OF SECONDARY USE
Three arguments support using cognitive research to analyze sec-
ondary use of informational goods. First, from a historical perspective,
copyright has ceased to subsist in rights to copy tangible goods and now
protects against a much wider range of activity designed to evoke pro-
prietary works in the minds of an audience. Beginning in the early
1900s, a dramatic increase in new technologies led Congress and the
courts to define copyright broadly across formats by reference to the
perceptual effect of uses. The precise boundaries of such rights have
never been satisfactorily explained. Second, owners sue and judges en-
join unauthorized secondary uses under copyright at least in part to
protect against overuse and degradation of consumer associations with
popular brands. Here, too, the extent to which copyright can and
should protect against changes in consumer perceptions is unclear.
Third, for consumers, works of information exist simultaneously
in tangible format ready for consumption, and in memory in need of
discussion and elaboration for proper encoding of experience. This
duality gives consumers interests on both sides of the debate. Secon-
dary use of expressive works of information can crowd the external
marketplace and distort the ability to engage productively with favor-
150
 Furthermore, copyright cannot be returned to its original status as a right of re-
production only. See Rubenfeld, supra note 112, at 55. New methods of distribution have
inexorably altered how people consume expressive works. See infra notes 148-83 and ac-
companying text. A right of reproduction today would provide less protection than it did
in 1856 because so many ways exist to "copy" a work without literal reproduction.
131
 Rubenfeld, supra note 112, at 44-45.
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ite works. Once experienced, however, free discussion of the elements
of shared cultural works facilitates categorization of knowledge, un-
derstanding of self, and development of cultural ties with peers. These
dynamics, drawn from consumer psychology research, reveal a colli-
sion between the goals of owner and audience that should inform the
secondary use debate.
A. From a Right of Reproduction to Right of Conceptual Representation
1. Early History
The development of the Copyright Act in the eighteenth century
reveals the roots of the current debate regarding overgrazing and
secondary use. To enable exploitation of works in formats like thea-
tre, radio, and film, owners sought to protect against use beyond lit-
eral reproduction. Owners fought for a right to represent the essence
of a work in any manner capable of being perceived. The boundaries
of this right to represent meaning across formats intersected with tra-
ditional audience reuse and recoding rights in a way that has not yet
been satisfactorily resolved.
The original copyright acts in both Britain and the United States
focused on the economics of the printing press, and so defined nar-
rowly the exclusive rights granted to an author. The early British
Copyright statute, the Statute of Anne, protected only the mechanical
rights to "print, reprint or import" a book.' 32 The first U.S. Copyright
statute was similarly limited to giving authors of maps and books the
exclusive right to "print[], reprint[], publish[], and vend" such
works.'" Courts in both jurisdictions read these rights to prohibit only
literal copying, and allowed subsequent authors free reign to use ex-
isting works as raw material in abridgements and translations.'"
The creation of a property right in something as ethereal as liter-
ary doctrine troubled jurists from the beginning. In Millar v. Tay* an
early British case addressing copyright's scope, one of the presiding
132 8 Ann„ c. 19 (1710) (Eng.).
I" Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
134 Scc, e.g, Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 343 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (distin-
guishing between "facile use of ... scissors" to condense a work and steal its most valuable
portions with "real, substantial condensation," which revealed "intellectual labor and
judgment" of bona fide new author); Burnett v. Chetwood, (1720) 35 Eng. Rep. 1008,
1009-10 (Ch.) (reasoning that the statute restrains only "the mechanical art of printing"
and not new translations).
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judges questioned the boundaries of this new form of intangible
property:
[T] he property here claimed is all ideal; a set of ideas which
have no bounds or marks whatever .... Their whole exis-
tence is in the mind alone; incapable of any other modes of
acquisition or enjoyment, than by mental possession or ap-
prehension ... . 135
In response to similar arguments in an earlier case, William
Blackstone articulated what was to become the standard response:
that the property right was not in the ideas put forth in the book but
was found in its actual text. 136
 Blackstone elaborated on this descrip-
tion in his second volume of the Commentaries published a few years
later. 137 Blackstone wrote that "[dile identity of a literary composition
consists entirely in the sentiment and language, the same conceptions,
cloaked in the same words, must necessarily be the same composition
...."138 He classified literary property as a type of estate similar to the
natural right of occupancy in unclaimed land.' 39
The limit of copyright to literal copying showed concern for the
rights of secondary authors but also sought to make expressive works
available to the widest possible audience. Abridgements served a valu-
able public interest by making more expensive, and in some cases
more complicated, works available in cheaper and simpler versions.
By protecting the ability of secondary authors to make use of previous
works, judges believed they were furthering aims of public education
and intellectual progress. 14° That an unauthorized derivative work
"8 Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 233 (KB.).
"8 Tonson v. Collins, (1761) 96 Eng. Rep. 180 (K.B.) ("Style and sentiment are the es-
sentials of a literary composition. These alone constitute its identity.").
1!7 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *406; See MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWN-
ERS: TIIE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 89-90 (1993).
"8 BLACKSTONE, supra note 137, *406.
139 Id. at *400-01, 405; ROSE, supra note 137, at 90.
140 Sec Banker v. Caldwell, 3 Minn. 94, 3 Gil. 46, 53 (1859) ("It has been a very difficult
question in the courts to determine what is original and what borrowed or pirated, in a
literary production. It cannot be necessary that the matter contained in a work, the
thought, sentiment and language, should be all original, to entitle the author to the pro-
tection of a copyright, because if such was the case, in the present advanced state of the
sciences, learning, and literature, we might look for very few additions which would fall in
the privileged sphere. It would exclude ... abridgments of works beyond the reach of
many, which now form a large portion of the means through which knowledge is conveyed
to the people.").
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might displace the market for the original or a licensed abridgement
or translation was not given much weight."'
Beyond exact text, the plot, characters, and sensibility of the
author were fair game for imitators and critics. For example, in 1853
the author Harriet Beecher Stowe sued the translators of an unau-
thorized version of Uncle Tom's Cabin targeted to German immi-
grants. 142 The 1831 Copyright Act in force at the time was silent on
the issue of derivative rights. 145 Stowe argued that the translation was a
direct copy, with only the mechanical signs having been changed.'"
The judge disagreed and read the Act to protect only the precise
words used by Stowe."5 He found that her characters, concepts, and
creations were public property, however, and "may be used and
abused by imitators, play-rights and poetasters," 145 After publication,
"[t] he author's conceptions have become the common property of his
readers, who cannot be deprived of the use of them, nor of their right
to communicate them to another clothed in their own language
"147
2. "Cognate" Rights
Soon after the Stowe decision, Congress began to expand copy-
right's scope to include non-literal copies. 145 It is the boundaries of
this expansion that have yet to be fully mapped out. For example, in
1856, Congress had added the right to perform a dramatic work pub-
1 " In an 1847 case, Judge McLean of the First Circuit Court of Appeals criticizes the
fair abridgement doctrine for its lack of attention to the effects on the sale of the work
abridged. See Story v. Holcombe, 23 F. Cas. 171, 172-73 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 13,497)
("The argument that the abridgement is suited to a different class of readers, by its cheap-
ness, and will be purchased on that account by persons unwilling and unable to purchase
the work at large, is not satisfactory. This to some extent may be true; but are there not
many who are able to buy the original work, that will be satisfied with the abridgement? ...
The reasoning on which the right to abridge is founded, therefore, seems to me to be false
in fact. It does to some extent in all cases, and not unfrequently to a great extent, impair
the rights of the author—a right secured by law."). Finding himself bound by precedent
based on the English doctrine, however, he refused to fully enjoin an abridgement of jus-
tice Story's Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence.
142 Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 201 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514).
"3 See Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436.
144 Stowe, 23 F. Cas. at 202-05.
145 Id. at 206-08.
146 Id. at 208.
147 Id. at 206.
148 Goldstein, supra note 65, at 213-14.
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licly to the exclusive rights of copyright owners. 149 Daly v. Palmer, de-
cided in 1868, defined the boundaries of an infringing perform-
ance.'" In that case, the plaintiff wrote a popular play involving a
dramatic rescue in front of an oncoming train.'" A British playwright
obtained a copy and wrote a different hit play in London containing a
similar scene. 152 A New York theatre sought to produce the second
play and Daly sought an injunction.'" The two plays shared little in
common in terms of dialogue, characters, or plot save for the infa-
mous railroad scene, and even that contained material differences.'"
The new right of public performance, however, freed the court from
side-by-side comparison as a test for infringement.'" Instead, the
court found that Daly's play could be infringed "by representation as
well as by printing, publishing, and vending." 156 The test of whether a
dramatization violated this right of "representation" was its ability
through movement and gesture to "excite[] emotions and impart[]
impressions" that the audience would experience as substantially simi-
lar to the original work. 157 Daly thus marked the first moment where
the rights protected by copyright ceased to subsist entirely in tangible
works and instead became focused on the impact of the work on pay-
ing audiences. 158
Technological advances pushed the boundaries of prohibited
"copying" further. Mechanical piano rolls first presented the question
of whether non-literal musical reproduction constituted a "reproduc-
tion" prohibited under the Act. 159 These rolls, perforated cylinders
designed to produce melodies when rotated inside a player piano,
gave the same impression of a person sitting and playing a composi-
tion off of sheet music. Music publishers sought royalties for such use,
but the pianola manufacturers argued that a perforated cylinder that
149 Act of August 18,1856, ch. 169,11 Stat. 138 (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 106
(2000)).
150 6 F. Cas. 1132,1135-39 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3552).
191 Id. at 1133.
142 Id. at 1133-34.
149 Id. at 1134.
144 See id. at 1134-35.
164 See Daly, 6 F. Cas. at 1135-38.
149 Id. at 1137-38.
147 Id. at 1137. The court found that "[ajil that is substantial and material in the plain-
tiffs 'railroad scene' has been used ... in the same order and sequence of events, and in a
manner to convey the same sensations and impressions to those who see it represented, as
in the plaintiffs play." Id. at 1138.
158 See Goldstein, supra note 65, at 213-14.
199 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 47, at 65.
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little resembled a piece of paper containing musical notations could
not violate copyright's reproduction right. 160 The courts were thus
presented with the question of whether a piano roll was a "copy" of
sheet music. 161
By the time the music rolls case reached the Supreme Court in
1908, in White-Smith Music Publishing Co, V. Apollo Co., the manufacture
and sale of such pianos had reached seventy five thotIsand and the
sale of the rolls had topped over one million per year. 162 Accordingly,
the Court chose a narrow reading of the then-current act and limited
the definition of "copy" to "reproduction or duplication of a thing." 163
"The statute has not provided for the protection of the intellectual
conception apart from the thing produced," wrote Justice Day for the
majority.'" Justice Holmes concurred, but wrote separately to argue
that to protect inventors fully, the statute should be revised to extend
protection not only to the form of a composition, but to its "es-
sence."165 "A musical composition is a rational collocation of sounds
apart from concepts .... On principle anything that mechanically
reproduces the sounds ought to be held a copy . . . ." 166
The publishers then took the matter up with Congress, which was
at the time in the process of holding hearings to revise the copyright
laws. 167 In 1909, Congress passed the 1909 Copyright Act, which
added several new rights for copyright holders. 168 In the case of dra-
matic works, these included the right to "represent" the work in whole
or in part "in any manner or by any method whatsoever"' 69 and, in the
case of musical compositions, the right to "make any arrangement or
setting of it or of the melody of it in any system of notation or any
form of record in which the thought of an author may be recorded
160 Id. at 66.
101 White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 8-11 (1908).
lei Id. at 9.
163 Id. at 17.
I" Id.
166 Id. at 19 (Holmes, J., concurring).
166 Apollo, 29 U.S. at 19-20 (Holmes, J., concurring).
167 GOLDSTEIN, WPM note 47, at 67; see also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distrib. Corp. v. Bi-
jou Theatre Co., 59 F.2d 70, 74 (1st Cir. 1932) (describing the desire to overturn the Ap-
pal° decision as one of the purposes of the 1909 Copyright Act).
168 Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 1(d), 35 Stat. 1075 (current version at 17 U.S.C.
§ 106 (2000)).
109 Id.
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and from which it may be read or reproduced .. .."' 7° These rights to
"represent" intangible works or reproduce "thought" quietly but ex-
plicitly expanded copyright's reproduction right from tangible objects
into the realm of perceptual similarities.
This transformation was complete when Holmes decided a 1911
case, Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., concerning a motion picture photo-
play. 171
 The case, involving a silent movie based on the novel Ben-Hui;
turned on the right added in 1870 to "dramatize" a book.'" Although
the silent movie was not literally similar to the text of the book,
Holmes relied on Daly to find that "[t] he essence of the matter ... is
not the mechanism employed but that we see the event or the story
lived."1 "
Holmes' insistence on locating the "essence" of the protected
work recalls Blackstone's attempts to identify what was "essential" in
copyright. Where Blackstone had located the borders of the literary
estate at the "sentiment and language ... the same conceptions
cloathed in the same words," 174
 Holmes had by 1911 extended the
boundaries to include anything that conveyed the same story to the
understanding of the audience. The 1909 Copyright Act and Holmes'
Kalem opinion paved the way for courts to apply the right of concep-
tual representation embraced in Daly to new technologies from the
printing press such as moving pictures, radio, television, and even
computer software.'" Any method of production that might call up
the "essence" of the composition in the mind of a paying audience
now fell within the limits of copyright.
The current Copyright Act reflects this expansion of the author's
domain. In the 1976 Copyright Act, the separate sections relating to
dramatic, literary, musical, or photographic works were for the most
part combined in favor of a unitary approach to the bundle of rights
granted under copyright.'" The exclusive reproduction right granted
to owners includes the right to produce a material object in which the
170 Id. § 1 (c). The Act made this latter right only prospective and provided a compul-
sory license to ensure that no producer could gain a monopoly over the entire format. See
GoLosTEIN, supra note 47, at 67.
See222 U.S. 55, 61-62 (1911).
1 " See id. at 61.
1 " Id.
174 BLACKSTONE, supra note 137, at *406.
17B See generally Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931) (radio); Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1250-54 (3d Cir. 1983) (com-
puter operating systems); Bijou Theatre Co., 59 F.2d at 75 (movies).
178 See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
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work can be "perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device."'" The deriva-
tive work right reserves to the owner "any other form in which a work
may be recast, transformed, or adapted."'"
Though this language has existed for over twenty years, courts
have not carefully examined the outer limits of this right of concep-
tual representation. 179 The "substantial similarity" test, which deter-
mines the boundaries between infringing and non-infringing similar
works, offers little guidance.'m Most courts look to an "ordinary ob-
server" or "audience" test that asks whether the new work evokes a
similar "impression" as the old, 181 or whether an ordinary observer
would conclude that the new work incorporated something of value
from plaintiffs work. 182 These tests expand the limits of copyright be-
yond literal similarity or even semantic similarity to any work that, in
the opinion of the average viewer or listener, evokes a former work.
Such tests assume without explanation that plaintiffs deserve control
over any aspect of their work with value to the audience, and at the
extreme threaten to elide copyright's cornerstone distinction between
protected expression and unprotectible ideas and concepts. 183
177 	§§ 101, 102.
"8 Id. §§ 101, 106.
17G See NIMMER & NtmmER,supra note 4, § 13.03 [A] at 13-35 to -36 (noting that the dis-
tinction between literal and non-literal similarity in copyright has received "almost no ex-
press judicial recognition").
180 Judge Learned Hand, the architect of the foundational approach to the modern
substantial similarity inquiry in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir.
1930), concluded in one of his last copyright cases that "[o]bviously, no principle can be
stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond copying the 'idea' and has borrowed its
'expression.' Decisions must therefore inevitably be ad hoc." Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Mar-
tin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
tat NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, §§ 13.03[E] [1] at 13-82, 13.03 [E] [2] at 13-89 to -
90.
1 °2 See Incredible Techs., Inc., V. Virtual Techs., Inc., 400 F.3d 1007, 1011 (7th Cir.
2005) (describing the "ordinary observer" test in the context of video games as "'whether
the accused work is so similar to the plaintiff's work that an ordinary reasonable person
would conclude that the defendant unlawfully appropriated the plaintiff's protectible ex-
pression by taking material of substance and value'"); Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384
F.3d 283, 297 (6th Cir. 2004) (same, and concluding that the question turns on whether
the "net impression" of the works' expressive elements are substantially similar to one an-
other); Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 281 F.3d 1287, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (same); Yan-
kee Candle Co., Inc. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 33 (1st Cir. 2001) (same);
Educ. Testing Servs. v. Katzman, 793 F.2d 533, 541 (3d Cir. 1986) (same); see also Yurman
Design, Inc. v. PAL Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 111 (2d Cir. 2001) (describing the ordinary observer
test as whether "an average lay observer would recognize the alleged copy as having been
appropriated from the copyrighted work").
It' Sex NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 13.03[A] [Il[c] at 13-46.
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3. Effect on Common Law Traditions of Parody, Burlesque, and
Pastiche
The confusion over copyright's boundaries is especially perni-
cious in cases where a new author seeks to reuse excerpts of an exist-
ing work for a different purpose. To date, no court has clearly defined
in the wake of the 1909 expansions whether the ability to communi-
cate subjective conceptions of an expressive work belongs to the audi-
ence or to the author. 184 Instead, resolution of this question has come
to focus on imprecise questions about the secondary user's motivation
in using the work.
Although nothing in the legislative history indicates that Congress
intended the 1909 Copyright Act to alter the common-law rights of
audience members to parody and burlesque popular works, the new
derivative rights did just that. 186 Before the revisions of 1909, the law
took a benign view of parody, satire, burlesque, pastiche, and other
forms of communicating alternative audience perceptions of a cultural
work. Such use was common as a form of commercial art and in every-
day discourse. On the stage, most popular plays were the subject of
parodies that were performed at about the same time as the origi-
nals. 186 Imitators often spoofed the styles of well-known writers and per-
formers. Newspapers reported or reproduced parodies of popular
154 Compare Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 720 F.2d 231, 242 (2d Cir.
1983) ("Stirring one's memory of a copyrighted character is not the same as appearing to
be substantially similar to that character, and only the latter is infringement."), with
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390, 399 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding use
of only a small portion of plaintiff's musical composition was infringement even where no
ordinary listener would notice the similarity), and Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.,
268 F.3d 1257, 1267 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding substantial similarity even when copyrighted
characters were "inverted" in imaginative retelling so that their traits, values and even set-
tings were opposite to the original), and Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v.
McDonald's Corp„ 562 F.2d 1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 1977) (finding infringement between
popular television show and characters in an advertisement despite lack of literal similarity
between characters because overall impression, effect, and "concept and feel" were simi-
lar), and Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Miramax Films Corp., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1186
(C.D. Cal. 1998) (finding substantial similarity where defendant's movie trailer consciously
evoked plaintiffs but used different actors and props and referred to completely different
subject matter).
m S. REP. No. 6187, at 1 (1907) (stating that the bill preserved common law adjudica-
tion of what constituted infringement and fair use); see also H.R. REP. No. 2222, at 7, 9
(1909) (stating that monopoly given to the author was ultimately intended to benefit the
public and that nothing in the bill intended to alter author's common-law rights with re-
spect to the work).
188
 Yankwich, supra note 83, at 1136; William Lyon Phelps, Daily Talk About Books and
Authors, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 1933, at 6 (noting how in past years two New York comedi-
ans always selected the most popular play of the year to burlesque).
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works frequently. 187 As far as courts were concerned, so long as the
parodist had not copied the previous work in its entirety, or set out to
replace rather than ridicule the original, parodies qualified as fair
use. 188
Not long after passage of the 1909 Copyright Act, judicial atti-
tudes towards parody and burlesque took a marked shift. The ability
to exploit a single work through the different mediums of radio, mo-
tion picture, and television led owners of popular dramatic works to
clamp down on parodists who transposed the work to a new format.
Judges began vilifying the act of parody itself as a taking no different
from any other theft. 189
For example, in 1955, a California district court enjoined a televi-
sion parody of a popular film. 19° The decision in the case, Loew's, Inc.
v. Columbia Broadcasting System, explicitly distinguished between ac-
ceptable and unacceptable formats for parody. 191 It drew a line be-
tween literature and scientific texts, where broad fair use and parody
might be allowed because such works aimed to further progress in the
arts and sciences, and fields where "business competition" existed
such as broadcast entertainment. 192 The court ruled that the factor of
whether "the infringing work ... has been issued for commercial
187 See A Parody, N.Y. Twos, Aug. 23, 1896, at 2 (reprinting a parody of Horace by Al-
exander Pope); A Parody, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1896, at 11 (reprinting an anonymous parody
of Emerson's Brahma); Barrie Denies Parody, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1921, at 23 (reporting the
denial of Sir James Barrie that he had written a parody of a Mrs. Asquith's memoirs re-
portedly entitled "Knees I Have Sat Upon."); Albert R. McKay, Parodies on "The White Man's
Burden.", N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1899, at BR351 (reprinting portions of a number of parodies
of Kipling's poem); Parody, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1885, at 12 (essay praising parodies for
their role in chastening and instructing authors).
lea See generally Green v. Luby, 177 F. 287 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909) (singing an entire song to
imitate popular singer took more than necessary and was infringement); Green v. M inzen-
sheimer, 177 F. 286 (C.C,S.D.N.Y. 1909) (singing the chorus and one verse of a copy-
righted song to parody the style of a popular singer was not infringement); Bloom & Ham-
lin v. Nixon, 125 F. 977 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1903) (same with respect to the chorus only).
189 See Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165, 183 (S.D. Cal.
1955), affil sub nom. Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), affd sub nom. by an
equally divided court, Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Loew's, Inc. 356 U.S. 43 (1958); Hill v.
Whalen & Martell, 220 F. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1914) (characters in play In Cartoonland were
clearly meant to be copyrighted Mutt and Jeff characters and so threatened to meet con-
sumer demand for an authorized dramatization of the strip).
199 Lam's, 131 F. Supp. at 186.
191 Id. at 175, 183.
192 Id. at 175 r[T] he law implies the consent of the copyright owner to a fair use of
his publication for the advancement of the science or art' ... We do not think ... [the]
use of the word art was used in a sense broad enough to include a T.V. program ....")
(emphasis added).
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gain, rather than in the interests of advancement of learning" was
crucia1. 193 Many commentators at the time, including Leon Yankwich,
the chief judge of the district, condemned the decision for its
cramped view of parody and satire and its contention that the
author's desire for commercial gain was "primary" in determining fair
use.'" Nonetheless, the decision was upheld and praised by both the
Ninth Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court. 198
The Loew's case introduced the dichotomy, picked up by the Su-
preme Court later in the 1994 decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc. between "true" parody that seeks to make a critical comment and
false parody, which looks only for attention or commercial profit. 198
Although the Court in Campbell provided greater leeway for commer-
cial parodies than in Loew's, it preserved the rhetorical distinction be-
tween true, disinterested critique and crass, attention-getting com-
mercialism. 197 The result has been a test that for the most part
distinguishes between commercial and non-commercial, or private
and public, expressive activity. 198 Since Loew's and Campbell, parody
and pastiche have greatly retreated from the commercial marketplace.
Those seeking to rework a popular text, comment on favorite charac-
ters through fiction, or call to mind iconic works in fine art, for ex-
ample, risk onerous lawsuits.'"
Digital technology, however, destabilizes the tenuous balance
drawn in cases like Loew's and Campbell. The Internet is quickly de-
stroying the boundaries between personal and public, and private and
commercial in communication. Private use of works, once considered
outside the scope of copyright, now takes place in increasingly public
193 Id. at 184-85.
194 See Yankwich, supra note 83, at 1151 (pointing out that "[m]aterial gain by writers
through parody and burlesque is not of modern origin," and that writers from the Greeks
through the great English parodists of the 15th and 16th centuries received compensation
for writing satires).
199
 Benny, 239 F.2d at 534, 537.
198 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 580-81 (1994); Loew's, 131 F. Supp.
at 174-76; see also MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 182 (2d Cir. 1981) ("While commer-
cial motivation and fair use can exist side by side, the court may consider whether the al-
leged infringing use was primarily for public benefit or for private commercial gain.");
Wainwright Secs., Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1977) ("[Fair
use] distinguishes between a true scholar and a chiseler who infringes a work for personal
profit.") .
197 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-85.
198 See LESSIG, supra note 13, at 8.
199 See, e.g., Donald G. McNeil Jr., On Stage and Off: Parody, but No One's Laughing, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 23, 1994, at C2 (noting the difficulties for small theater companies in mount-
ing parodies of well-known works).
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fora. For example, Marvel Comics recently brought a lawsuit to pre-
vent fans of its superhero comics from "dressing up" as their pro-
tected characters in an unaffiliated fantasy game. 2® Marvel obviously
wants to protect the audience for its authorized games, but its stance
is not so distinct from attempting to prohibit pretend games in one's
backyard.
Distance-learning courses have similarly challenged the tradi-
tional fair use exception for educational discussions and perform-
ances. The original exception assumed a face-to-face interaction in a
classroom setting. In 2002 Congress had to pass a special rule clarify-
ing that the exception applied to online learning environments as
wevoi For-profit institutions, which are increasingly prevalent, and
libraries, which host many such courses, however, remain outside the
exception. 202 The ability of students in those classes to "discuss" copy-
righted works online free of charge remains in doubt.
To say that copyright extends to audience perception then does
not answer the question of where to draw copyright's boundaries. Al-
though the question arises in numerous fair use cases, courts have not
clarified at what point an audience's memory and perception of char-
acters, music or other expressive elements becomes the property of
the audience. 2" The proper balance between the owner's right to
profit from the original creation and the audience's right to identify
with, consider, rework, and discuss the significance of the work re-
mains unresolved.
For this reason, those who argue that the dynamics of digital net-
works should control the contours of user rights may aim too nar-
rowly.204 These technologies are still developing and will change many
times in the corning decades. What will remain the same, or at least
will shift more slowly over time, are the mechanics of human compre-
hension. Just as owners have fought for rights that are purposefully
not technology-specific but extend to anything that sends a cognitive
message, so should user rights not depend on technology, but should
200 See generally Alex Veiga, Marvel Sues Firms Behind Online Superhero Role-Playing Game,
N. COUNTY TIMES (Cal.), Nov. 12, 2004, available at http://www.nctimes.com/articles/
2004/11/12/spec ial_reports/science_technolog-y/16_04_5011,3 1_04.prt.
201 Technology. Education and Copyright Harmonization Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 110(2),
112(f) (2000). See Kristine H. Hutchinson, Note, The TEACFI Act: Copyright Law And Online
Education, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2204 (2003), for a description of problems with the Act.
"2 Hutchinson, supra note 201, at 2225-27.
"3 See infra notes 271-321 and accompanying text.
"4 See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 106, at 52.
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be grounded in the workings of information perception. 205 Otherwise,
the battle that Congress feared for authors, in which they would have
to litigate every new technological advance to determine protection,
is being fought by users to defend a diminishing universe of fair uses
with each new technological breakthrough.
B. Copyright Ownership in a Desired Brand Identity
The extension of copyright into amorphous realms of consumer
perception has led authors and owners to claim an ownership right in
the preservation of a desired brand identity. From their standpoint,
the right to represent a story or song across mediums must include
the ability to halt competing representations of the same work, even if
the two works are not confusingly similar or do not serve the same
purpose or audience, Because profitability in entertainment and in-
creasingly retail industries depends on being able to repurpose famil-
iar popular works across a variety of media, owners must vigilantly
protect core works to ensure that varied incarnations maintain a con-
sistent meaning and identity to consumers. 206 The introduction of
negative or dissonant associations with a marquee work threatens the
ability of that work to support large tie-in and promotional enter-
prises. This, at least, is the harm claimed when owners sue to enjoin
unauthorized secondary use. By adding a copyright claim to what are
essentially trademark concerns, owners are able to sidestep trade-
mark's broader free speech safeguards. Courts have been inconsistent
in their willingness to entertain claims based on alteration in con-
sumer perception in the context of copyright. The uncertainty of
both trademark and copyright rules in this area has left consumers
and secondary users without clear guidance.
1. Positive and Negative Associations
Due to their negligible marginal cost, entertainment companies in-
crease profits by producing and distributing products to as many
audiences and markets as possible. 207 Producers may distribute
2°5 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 51 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5664.
2" See, e.g., MICHAEL]. WOLF, THE ENTERTAINMENT ECONOMY 25 (1999) (noting how
the need to attract audience attention has led studios to consolidate assets with networks,
cable TV stations, and book publishers to market and distribute products through a variety
of outlets).
°7 See id. at 97-98,228-30,
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profitable works through new channels, such as releasing films on
television and DVDs. Many films earn more through DVD sales than
they do in their initial box office run. 208 Marketers repurpose and re-
cycle profitable works through sequels, spin-offs, adaptations, and
promotional tie-ins. 209 Books become movies, movies reappear as mu-
sicals or video games, and popular songs animate advertising or films.
Once a work has achieved commercial success, its audience will follow
it from product to product. Tie-in products increase loyalty by height-
ening familiarity and engagement with the work. 210 Some brands earn
more through merchandising than through the original product.
Winnie-the-Pooh, for example, has grown from a tubby little bear to a
billion dollar franchise for Disney through sales of DVDs, toys, and his
popular theme-park ride, the Honey Hunt. 211
The ability to repurpose characters and brand images lowers risks
and costs for owners. Use of an already popular story line or character
offers more predictable revenues and requires less promotion. 212 No
matter what, the tie-in product will interest some segment of the
audience. 21s The strength of established works is not just theory. Of
the top ten films of all time by revenue, for example, five are sequels
or prequels, and four are based on popular books or comics. 2"
208 David D. Kirkpatrick, Action-Hungry DVD Fans Sway Hollywood, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17,
2003, at Al ("Home video sales accounted for more than 58 percent of Hollywood's in-
come last year, more than twice as much as box-office revenues.").
2" Benjamin A. Goldberger, How the "Summer of the Spinoff Came to Be: The Branding of
Characters in Awed can Mass Media, 23 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REV, 301, 317-47 (2003) (describ-
ing the various media into which characters may be spun off and reused).
210 WOLF, supra note 206, at 231 ('When a company offers theme parks, hotels ...
movies, toys, fast food, books, videos, records, magazines, clothing, and other products, the
hope is that all these products and the efforts behind them will mesh and contribute to a
chain reaction that creates more energy, awareness and economic effect than any single
aspect might have done on its own."); see JOHN O'SHAUGHNESSY SC NICHOLAS JACKSON
CYSHAUGHNESSY, PERSUASION IN ADVERTISING 63 (2004); Pessach, supra note 78, at 1093.
211 See Laura Bradford, Who Owns Pooh?: Disney Fights in Court over Digital Rights to a
'Silly Old Bear" as New Technology Casts Doubt on Old Contracts, TIME, Jul. 15, 2002, at B16.
Another example is the Jurassic Park movie series. The first two movies themselves garnered
$1.5 billion in worldwide box office sales, while receipts from home videos, toys, video
games, amusement park rides, and other revenue streams has approached $3.5 billion.
WOLF, supra note 206, at 229.
212 Goldberger, supra note 209, at 327-29.
211
 WOLF, supra note 206, at 224-25 (stating that we are predisposed to accept, or at
least look at, anything that carries the brand of a big entertainment company).
214
 All Time Box Office Domestic Grosses, hup://www.boxofficemojo.com/alltime/
domestic.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2005). The five sequels are Shrek 2; Lord of the Rings:
Return of the King, Star Wars I: The Phantom Menace, Spider-Man 2; and Star Wars III: Revenge of
the Sith. In addition to Spider-Man 2 and Lord of the Rings, the other films based on books
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Identifiable brands form the center of this juggernaut. For enter-
tainment products, characters, situations, melodies, authors, and de-
signs can all act as brand signifiers. 215 To the purchasing public, the
use of a popular character or recognizable tune acts as an information
shortcut or heuristic. Consumers save time and energy evaluating a
product by conferring on the product their associations with the
brand. 216 To perform this function effectively, brands must maintain a
consistent personality and identity. 217 In fact, research studies show
that consumers punish products and brands that require too much
effort to evaluate.218 A brand that stands for something simple is
"more memorable, more visible and more meaningful" than a brand
associated with a variety of images. 219 To keep parents and children
invested in purchasing new Winnie-the-Pooh DVDs, for example, Dis-
ney must ensure that he maintains a loveable and innocent persona
through all licensed uses.
Marketers know that whatever is associated with a brand has the
power to affect its image. Mechanisms in our brains automatically
classify things as "good" or "bad" as soon as we perceive them. 220 If
something that anchors an entertainment brand, such as a popular
character or a well-known song, is associated with something that trig-
gers a positive emotional response, our appreciation of the brand in-
creases. 221 Accordingly, much of modern advertising is designed to
are Spider-Man and The Passion of the Christ. Only Titanic, ET and Star Wars boast original
concepts.
215 See °SHAUGHNESSY & O'SuAuGuNrssY, supra note 210, at 40-41, 60; see also Cristel
A. Russell et al., People and "Their" Television Shows: An Overview of Television Connectedness, in
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ENTERTAINMENT MEDIA: BLURRING THE LINES BETWEEN ENTER
TAINMENT AND PERSUASION 275, 284 (LI Shrum ed., 2004) (arguing that television shows
act as brands).
216 °SHAUGHNESSY & O'SHAUGUINESSY, supra note 210, at 60; see DAVID N. MARTIN,
ROMANCING THE BRAND: THE POWER OF ADVERTISING AND How TCI USE IT 89 (1989);
WOLF, SUP/II note 206, at 223.
217
 MARTIN, supra note 216, at 89-92; O'SIIAUGHNESSY & °SHAUGHNESSY, supra note
210, at 66; see WOLF, supra note 206, at 223-24.
218 Ellen C. Garbarino & Julie A. Edell, Cognitive Effort, Affect, and Choice, 24 J. CON-
SUMER RES. 147, 156 (1997).
219 °SHAUGHNESSY & °SHAUGHNESSY, supra note 210, at 66; see MARTIN, supra note
216, at 92; WOLF, supra note 206, at 223.
229 ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN
BRAIN 116-17 (1994); O'SHAUGHNESSY & °SHAUGHNESSY, supra note 210, at 62, 124;
Magda Teresa Garcia & John A. Bargh, Automatic Evaluation of Novel Words: The Role of
Superficial Phonetics, 221 LANGUAGE & SOC, PSYCHOL. 914, 414 (2003).
221 See Sarah C. Haan, Note, The "Persuasion Route" of the Law: Advertising and Legal Per-
suasion, 100 Como. L. REV. 1281, 1299 (2000). According to an influential 1991 Advertis-
ing Research Foundation study, "likeability* in an advertisement is the single best predictor
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increase positive associations with advertised brands and products
through use of symbolic and emotional appeals to the values of the
target audience. 222
Negative information, however, has an even greater impact on
brand association than positive information. 225 Brand images are de-
veloped over time. 224 Consumers learn to "trust" a brand through re-
peated exposure. 225 If a brand somehow has been associated with in-
compatible values or unpleasant images, consumers will be less likely
to purchase it. 226 Studies suggest that the negative perception of the
brand will persist for some time even through attempts by the owners
to provide countering information. 227
Frequent exposure can also harm consumer attitudes. During
initial introduction to a brand or message, frequency of exposure in-
creases familiarity and likeability.228 Individuals tend to misattribute
the increased ease of processing of a familiar message to the content
of the message itself, and so find their tolerance of and positive atti-
tude toward the message increase over time. 229 Consumers thus will
of effectiveness in promoting brand memory and purchasing decisions. Russell I. Haley &
Allan L. Baldinger, The ARF Copy Research Validity Project, 31 J. AnvEuTtsiNo RES. 11, 29
(1991).
222 See O'SilAuGHNEssv & USHAUGHNESSY, supra note 210, at 57-59, 64; see also MAR-
11N, supra note 216, at 95 ("In advertising, we seek to shape attitudes .... What we want is
for the consumer to remember the brand and what it offers and to have a positive attitude
about trying it,").
2R3 USHAUGHNESSY & CrSHAUGHNESSY, supra note 210, at 63; see also Stephen J. Hoch
& Young-Won Ha, Consumer Learning: Advertising and the Ambiguity of Product Experience, 13 J.
CONSUMER RES. 221, 223 (1986) (stating that because of asymmetric costs of different
types of errors, people are more wary of mistakenly accepting something that might be
bad than mistakenly rejecting something that might be good).
224 MARTIN, supra note 216, at 89.
225 O'SnAtionnESSY & O'SHAUGHNEsSY, supra note 210, at 63, 67.
226 See CrSHAUGIINES5Y & O'SnAuonNESSY, supra note 210, at 64-65; cf. Jennifer Aaker
et al., When Good Brands Do Bad, 31 J. CONSUMER RES. 1, 13 (2004) (summarizing study that
showed that consumer relationships with "sincere" brands, defined as those like Hallmark
or Ford that show traits of nurturance, warmth, family-orientation, and traditionalism,
suffered more after "transgression" by the brand, than consumer relationships with excit-
ing, "trendy" brands, such as MTV or Virgin).
227 0. ..SHAUGHNESSY & O'SIIAUGHNESSY, supra note 210, at 59-60.
228 See Robert B. Zajonc & Hazel Marcus, Affective and Cognitive Factors in Preferences, 9 J.
CONSUMER RES, 123, 125 (1982).
229 See John A. Bargh, Conditional Automaticity: Varieties of Automatic Influence in Social
Perception and Cognition, in UNINTENDED THOUGHT 3, 14 ( James S. Uleman & John A.
Bargh eds., 1989) (noting that frequency of exposure to a subject produces positive feel-
ings of trust and liking due to ease of recall that is misattributed to the qualities of the
subject itself); see also J. Lee McCullough & Thomas M. Ostrom, Repetition of Highly Similar
Messages and Attitude Change, 59 J. APPLIED l'svcnoL. 395, 395-97 (1974) (finding positive
feelings towards print advertisements increased with moderate exposure).
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respond more favorably to messages communicated frequently even if
they initially disagree with the message or find its source not credi-
ble. 23° After a certain level of unvaried exposure, however, tedium sets
in and consumers will begin to feel negatively toward the message or
brand.23 ' Owners of expressive properties carefully manage audience
exposure to enhance familiarity but to decrease the likelihood of
audience fatigue. 232
These marketing truisms explain the panic of brand managers
when an outsider uses a brand element in an unauthorized way. Al-
though owners may eschew smaller players when it comes to licensing,
they will pay attention to even slight secondary uses done without per-
mission.233
 Such uses threaten to taint carefully managed brand cam-
paigns by association with negative or even just inconsistent elements.
According to media reports and publicly filed complaints, this
harm to the perceptive value of a character or work is precisely the
concern of litigants seeking to enjoin secondary uses. For example,
after a flash animation film swept around the Internet in the fall of
2004 with President George W. Bush and John Kerry singing to the
tune of Woody Guthrie's This Land is Your Land, the music publisher
that owned the copyright to Guthrie's tune sought to stop distribution
of the film. 234 The concern was not that the spoof would directly sub-
230 Sec Alan Sawyer, Repetition, Cognitive Responses, and Persuasion, in COGNITIVE RE-
SPONSES IN PERSUASION 237-44 (Richard E. Petty et al. eds., 1981); see also Bargh, supra
note 229, at 14 (positing that frequency of exposure to a subject produces positive feelings
of trust and liking due to ease of recall that is misattributed to the qualities of the subject
itself).
231 See John T. Cacioppo & Richard E. Petty, Central and Peripheral Routes to Persuasion:
The Role of Message Repetition, in PSYCHOLOGICAL. PROCESSES AND ADVERTISING EFFECTS:
THEORY, RESEARCH, ANn APPLICATIONS 91, 99 (Linda F. Alwitt & Andrew A. Mitchell eds.,
1985) (repetition of audio messages); Sawyer, supra note 230, at 247, 250-53; Bobby J. Cal-
der & Brian Stern thal, Television Commercial Wearout: An Information Processing View, 171
MARKETING RES. 173, 185-86 (1980) (repetition of television ads).
2" See Bill Britt, Disney's Global Goals, MARKETING, May 17, 1990, at 26 ('To avoid over-
kill, Disney manages its character portfolio with care. It has hundreds of characters on its
books, many of them just waiting to be called out of retirement .... Disney practices good
husbandry of its characters and extends the life of its brands by not over-exposing them
.... They avoid debasing the currency.").
233 See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text; cf. J.C. HERZ, JOYSTICK NATION: How
VIDEOGAMES Am OUR QUARTERS, WON OUR HEARTS, AND REWIRED OUR MINDS 134
(1997) ("Nintendo's in-house characters are its crown jewels. And the company is fastidi-
ous, to the point of paranoia, about safe-guarding their reputations.").
234 Allen Wastler, A fibjab Showdown, CNN MONEY. July 26, 2004, http://money.
cnn.com/2004/07/26/commentary/wasder/wastler/ . The publisher sent a cease and desist
letter to the film's producers, who then filed a declaratory judgment action seeking protec-
tion as fair use in the form of parody. Evan Hansen, fibfab Beats Copyright Rap, CNET
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stitute for sales of albums or singles featuring the song, nor was it hav-
ing to forego whatever nominal license fee the cartoonists might have
paid. Kathryn Ostien, director of copyright licensing for the pub-
lisher, told CNN that the harm was the creation of new associations
with the song, presumably those of political carping and dissension
stating, "This puts a completely different spin on the song. The dam-
age to the song is huge.”235
Other copyright owners express similar concerns about the harm
of secondary use on the perceptive value of the original. Mattel has
sued artists for using its protected Barbie characters in a song about
materialism256 and in fine art photographs or reproductions that placed
the doll in erotic or sexualized positions.257 In these cases, Mattel
claimed that the connection of the doll with such unpleasant associa-
tions harmed the value of the toy itself in addition to markets for li-
censed derivatives. 258 The guardians of Margaret Mitchell's estate, Sun-
Trust Bank, may have objected to Alice Randall's sexually explicit
reworking of Gone With the Wind for similar reasons. 2" Likewise,
Barney's owners sued to enjoin a skit wherein the San Diego Chicken
beat up an imposter Barney because children in the audience had been
frightened and might be turned off the brand. 24° Lever Brothers suc-
ceeded in enjoining a parody commercial for a video game in which its
Snuggle fabric softener bear was attacked by tanks in part because of
the commercial's association of the Snuggle bear with violence. 2"
NEWS.COM, Aug. 25, 2004, http://news ,com.com/Jibiab+beats+copyright+rap/100-026_
5322970. html. The parties settled soon thereafter, after attorneys found evidence that the
copyright on Mr. Guthrie's song expired in 1973. Id.
235 wastler, supra note 234.
258 Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.34 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2002) (suing for
trademark dilution).
297 Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 796-97 (9th Cir. 2003); Mat-
tel, Inc. v. Pitt, 229 F. Supp. 2d 315, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
"a See Walking Mountain, 353 F.3d at 805; MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 902-03.
9" Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1282-83 (11th Cir. 2001)
(attributing to SunTrust a 'vigilance" in policing Gone With the Wind's public image and
speculating that the claim was aimed in part at preserving the book's reputation).
240 Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 7-8, Lyons P'ship v. Giannoulas, 179 F.3d 384 (5th
Cir. 1999) (No. 98-11003), 1998 WL 34085765.
241 Conopco, Inc. v. 3D0 Co., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d 1146, 1147 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (describing
the injunction in a later contempt action); see also Memorandum of Law in Support of
Plaintiff's Application for a Temporary Restraining Order, a Preliminary Injunction, and
an Order for Expedited Discovery at 21, Conopco, Inc. v. MO, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d 1146
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (No. 99 Civ. 10893). Many of these cases are brought under both trade-
mark and copyright. Courts do not always distinguish between these regimes in issuing
injunctions. Sce, Conopco, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1147 (quoting from original TRO order).
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2. Overlap with Trademark Dilution
In this way, the extension of copyright to cognition has prompted
owners to seek remedies when the "goodwill" associated with expres-
sive elements is threatened. Such copyright suits function similar to
actions for trademark dilution. Indeed, many secondary use cases
proceed under both trademark dilution and copyright infringement
theories. 242 Despite the overlap in function, however, copyright pro-
tection is more problematic than trademark when used to protect a
work's signaling function because it suppresses a greater range of ex-
pressive activity. Trademark protects the ability of merchants to com-
municate information to consumers about the source of goods or
services. 243 Derived from Congress' power to regulate commerce, it
applies only to commercial uses on like goods. 244 By contrast, copy-
right governs every reproduction or representation of proprietary
works, no matter how small or personal. Trademark thus relates only
to the ability to choose goods in the marketplace, whereas copyright
governs choice between goods and the buyer's use of those goods.
Trademark protection also differs from copyright in that it is ex-
plicitly limited only to "confusing" or demonstrably harmful uses. 245
Trademark infringement cases examine a list of factors such as simi-
larity of the marks and channels of trade to determine whether a jun-
ior mark infringes a senior one. 246 Copyright litigation requires no
evidence that audiences be confused or misled by similarities between
uses. In limited circumstances, owners of famous trademarks may sue
in federal court to enjoin commercial use of similar marks on unre-
lated goods under a "dilution" theory, but to do so they must provide
evidence of actual harm to the mark in the form of blurring or tar-
242 See, e.g., Walking Mountain, 353 F.3d at 797; Giannoulas, 179 F.3d at 387; Dr. Seuss
Enters., L.P., v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1396, 1403 (9th Cir. 1997);
Onwpco, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1147.
246 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000) ("The term 'trademark' includes any word, name, sym-
bol, or device, or any combination thereof—(1) used by a person, or (2) which a person has
a bona fide intention to use in commerce ... to identify and distinguish his or her goods,
including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate
the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.").
244 Id. ,§ 1114.
245 Id. (describing trademark infringement as uses of marks that are likely to cause
confusion among consumers); Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433
(2003) (holding that action for trademark dilution requires proof of actual harm to eco-
nomic value of a mark).
246 See Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 456 (2d Cir. 2004).
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nishment of its meaning among relevant consumers. 247 In copyright
secondary use cases, courts presume harm to the work through unau-
thorized use. 248 They place the burden on the user to prove the value
of the secondary use through affirmative defenses such as parody. 249
For these reasons, the interpretation of copyright to cover consumer
associations provides a kind of super-trademark protection that omits
trademark's safeguards against overreaching.
No court has yet taken the trouble to examine forthrightly
whether or not dilution of a work's meaning properly falls under
copyright. Instead, courts have been alternatively receptive or dismis-
sive  of the theory depending on their opinion of the value of the sec-
ondary use. Where courts find the secondary use to be legitimate
criticism of the original or otherwise sympathetic to the message of
the new work, they will dismiss the plaintiffs suit as an attempt to
shield the work from effective critique. 250 Although these judges may
be right that the public interest in satire outweighs potential harm to
a brand, they are wrong when they state that plaintiffs seek only to
avoid criticism. The plaintiffs' concerns are much broader and more
banal; they seek to avoid any use that conflicts with a managed brand
personality. Indeed, where courts are less sympathetic to the parody at
issue or do not find a direct "critique" present, they are more recep-
tive to the idea that loss of control over public presentation works an
irreparable harm to the value of the original text. 251 For example, in a
247 Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433. At least one lower court has found this requirement to be
looser in the subset of cases where the defendant's mark is identical or virtually identical to
the plaintiff's. See Savin Corp., 391 F.3d at 452. State standards may also be less stringent, see
id. at 456, but not all states have their own dilution acts.
243 See, e.g., MyWebGrocer, LLC v. Hometown Info, Inc., 375 F.3d 190, 192 (2d Cir.
2004); Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 627 (9th Cir. 2003).
249 See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592-94.
259 Walking Mountain, 353 F.3d at 806; Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1282-83 ("Suntrust
may be vigilant of Gone With the Wind's public image—but it may not use copyright to
shield Gone With the Wind from unwelcome comment ...."); Consumers Union of U.S.,
Inc. v. Gets. Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1094, 1050 (2d Cir. 1983) ("The fourth factor is aimed
at the copier who attempts to usurp the demand for the original work. The copyright laws
are intended to prevent copiers from taking the owner's intellectual property and are not
aimed at recompensing damages which may flow indirectly from copying.") (internal cita-
tions omitted).
251 See, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P., 109 F.3d at 1403 (considering harm to the substantial
"goodwill and reputation" associated with Dr. Seuss in enjoining unauthorized use of Dr.
Seuss's copyrighted Cat in the Hat character in a book about the O.J. Simpson murder
trial); Conopco, Inc., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1149 (noting that use of a bear character in enjoined
commercial "potentially broadly damaged SNUGGLE OD Bear's reputation"); United Fea-
ture Syndicate Inc., v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (considering effect that
large numbers of unauthorized sculptures of cartoon characters would have on public's
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case concerning the use of a James Bond-like character in an adver-
tisement for Honda automobiles, a court enjoined the commercial
because of the risk that association of Bond with a "low-end" car like
Honda would harm the brand's upscale licensing strategy.252
For potential users, the uncertainty surrounding this question
chills expressive activity and innovation, If secondary authors can
convince a court that theirs is a true comment on the original work,
the court will discount any harm to brand perception. If, on the other
hand, a court rejects the parodic message, loss of control over public
associations with the brand most likely will be considered as a market
harm. The Supreme Court suggested in a footnote in the Campbell
decision that, where market harm is unlikely, a secondary use could
be less targeted at the original and still qualify as fair use. 253
 This sug-
gestion of flexibility is illusory because from a branding standpoint,
all uses of a protected work trespass on potential markets. 254
The legal framework thus embodies a one-way assumption for the
meaning of expressive texts. According to the law, except in very lim-
ited circumstances, owners get to decide how consumers communi-
cate publicly about popular works. This account, based on observa-
tions about real property, ignores the participatory nature of
informational goods. Such goods derive much of their value from
their use and significance to others. 255
 If we allow owners to profit
from the positive effects when the public embraces their work, we
probably should ask them to bear more risk if audience members
grow disenchanted, bored, or rebellious.
One answer to the branding question would be to rule that con-
sumer perception and opinion is completely outside the bounds of
copyright. Multiple imitations of a work may "devalue" that work in
desire for licensed products); Dr. Pepper Co. v. Sambo's Rests., Inc., 517 F. Supp. 1202,
1208-09 (MD. Tex. 1981) (enjoining local television commercial parody of plaintiff's suc-
cessful "Be A Pepper" campaign because distractions from the uniqueness and originality
of the commercials would logically shorten the life of the ad campaign and damage busi-
ness goodwill); cf. Merges, Of Property Rules, supra note 40, at 2659 n.15 (noting copyright's
policy of favoring authors' reputational interest by ensuring that authors can control all
manifestations of a work).
252
 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1300-
01 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
2" Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580 n.14.
254
 Indeed, in the ten years since the decision, no court has been willing to rest a fair
use determination on this basis alone.
255
 Pessach, supra note 78, at 1084.
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the popular mind, but the work itself is not altered.256 The same effect
could be found if a purchaser plays a new album over and over to the
point where she never wants to hear it again, but the law does not al-
low the copyright owner to forbid such use.
The problem with discounting consumer perception altogether is
the difficulty of separating such a claim from a legitimate cause of ac-
tion within copyright. The Copyright Act disallows copying of protected
elements in any form, absent a few specific exceptions. 257 Such clear
and certain boundaries are thought to facilitate trade and investment
in creative works. 258 Accordingly, an owner need not demonstrate any
harm before she is entitled to enjoin the new use or receive damages, 256
To qualify as a fair use of the work, the burden rests on the secondary
user to prove that the use will not harm the value of the original. 260
Diminishment of consumer demand is relevant to this inquiry.
One could distinguish between harm through direct market sub-
stitution and harm through indirect diminishment of brand appeal and
audience demand. Indeed, courts often claim to be doing just this. 26i In
a world where every possible derivative belongs to the owner, however,
it is difficult to imagine a work that does not directly substitute for some
256 For an articulation of this specific critique, see Arlen W. Langvardt & Kyle T
Langvardt, Unwise or Unconstitutional? The Copyright Term Extension Act, the Eldred Decision,
and the Freezing of the Public Domain for Private Benefit, 5 MINN. PROP. REV. 193, 244
(2004). Arlen and Kyle Langvardt find attention to consumer opinion generally inconsis-
tent with copyright's mandate to promote progress in the arts and sciences. See id. They do
not examine the specific consequences of including alteration of consumer perceptions as
part of an analysis of market harm caused by secondary use.
257 17 U.S.C. §§ 106-112 (2000).
258 Sec supra notes 35-47 and accompanying text.
258 See MyWebGrocer, 375 F.3d at 192; Elvis Presley Enters., 349 F.3d at 627.
266 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590, 594. Courts determine whether an unauthorized use is
"fair" upon consideration of four factors. These include: (1) the purpose and character of
the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the
portion taken; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
261 See, e.g., Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1280-81 (distinguishing between works that
"capitalize on ...notoriety" and those that directly . substitute and stating that critical
screeds are unlikely to act as substitutes). In between frontal critical attacks and direct
substitutes, however, there lies a whole universe of subtle materials and messages that
could impair audience demand in a related market, compare id. at 1281 n.4 (declining to
consider harm of widespread unauthorized sequels on markets for authorized derivatives
of a famous book where unauthorized book was, in the court's opinion, clearly and di-
rectly critical of original), with United Features Inc., 817 F. Supp. at 382 (considering harm
that widespread unauthorized derivative sculptures could pose to underlying comic book
character's licensing value in all potential three-dimensional or merchandising markets in
finding that satirical but not overtly critical fine art reproduction was not a fair use).
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possible licensed use. 262 Furthermore, the difference between direct
and indirect substitution may be illusory for the owner. The owner is
just as injured if demand is diverted to a pirate as if demand dries up
due to audience fatigue. In reality, the two may boil down to the same
thing. The traditional description of a use that substitutes is one that
will usurp the demand for the original. 263 Exhausting a work's novelty
value in service of another product arguably qualifies as "substitutive"
under this definition. 264 Excluding consideration of consumer percep-
tion then would require at a minimum a significant reconfiguration of
the derivative right and the fair use analysis.
This doctrinal confusion reflects the reality that unauthorized
dilution poses problems for some works under copyright that do not
exist for non-expressive works such as those covered by patent. Take a
proven pharmaceutical product like a heart or cholesterol drug. If a
pirate attempts to pass off his goods as the proven item, if a disaf-
fected consumer uses the trademark in a disparaging way, or even if a
celebrity actor publicly lambasts the drug on a popular morning tele-
vision show, the drug will work the same way when administered to a
patient. The efficacy of the product itself has never been altered, By
contrast, the entire purpose of a creative work is to deliver a particular
message to an audience. Unfettered secondary use of the creative
elements of the work may alter the ability of the original to deliver its
intended message. Diminishment of the work's communicative im-
pact may lessen incentives to invest in the production and dissemina-
tion of creative works. In this way, copyright and trademark may le-
gitimately overlap in protecting a work's expressive value. 265
262 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 593 n.24 (noting that because all parodies are also poten-
tially substitutes for a licensed work in a derivative market, it may be difficult to separate
permissible harm caused by criticism from impermissible harm caused by substitution).
Justice Souter does not clarify whether harm to the work's retail value through inconsis-
tent use or overuse is properly understood as "effectiveness of critical commentary" or
"substitution." See id.
265 See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432,438 (9th Cir. 1986).
264 See Patry & Posner, supra note 32, at 1644-45 (suggesting that use that impairs a
work's market or value though "free-riding" is not a fair use).
265 Professor Lemley has argued that diminishment of value to producers caused by
new entrants to a market is the hallmark of what economists refer to as a "perfect market"
and so is not a cause for concern. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post, supra note 11, at 144. If we
equate "value" with price, then Lemley is right. If, however, "value" is taken to mean
efficacy or utility of the good, then everyone loses through overuse. Lemley's account is
thus a better fit for goods such as software products than for communicative goods such as
texts and music.
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Trademark protection by itself may be sufficient to address these
harms. Trademark and unfair competition theories are designed to
police against secondary uses that deceive consumers or inordinately
dilute the expressive value of symbols. 266 Because trademark reaches
only commercial uses, using trademark alone to safeguard the signal-
ing function of a work could by itself provide more latitude for secon-
dary use and recoding.267
This solution is doctrinally satisfying but practically elusive. For
one thing, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Dastar Carp. v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Coll. limited the use of trademark theories
to protect expressive elements of a copyrighted work. 269 Furthermore,
given the collective clout of the copyright industries, it is highly un-
likely that Congress would actually repeal portions of the derivative
and distribution rights and the fair use exception necessary to remove
copyright from the balance.269 Additionally, trademark dilution itself
is a notoriously slippery concept and so may not provide much ex
ante certainty to encourage secondary users. 279
Whatever doctrinal scheme is used to address branding concerns,
a primary concern should be to provide secondary authors with clear
and predictable guidelines about what kinds of uses are "fair" or ex-
empted, Boundaries that are simple and easy to understand will re-
duce enforcement and transaction costs for owners, and will provide
greater certainty and latitude to secondary users, especially those who
266 See Joseph P. Bauer, A Federal Law of Unfair Competition: What Should Be the Reach of
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act?, 31 UCLA L. REV. 671, 703, 707 (1984).
267 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (4) (B) (2000) (exempting non-commercial use).
268 539 U.S. 23, 32 (2003) (stating that trademark protects information about the
source of a tangible good, but not ideas or communications embodied in a communicative
product). A discussion of the problems with the Dastar decision is beyond the scope of this
Article, but many have pointed out that the Dastar decision rests on dubious interpreta-
tions of the terms "origin" and "goods" in the Lanham Act. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, The
Right to Claim Authorship in U.S. Copyright and Trademarks Law, 41 Hous. L. REV. 263, 270,
273 (2004); Laura A. Heymann, The Birth of the Authornym: Authorship, Pseudonymity, and
Trademark Law, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1440-44 (2005).
269 cf, Viva R. Moffat, Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: The Problem of Overlapping
Intellectual Property Protection, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1473, 1496-97 & n.125 (2004) (noting
the sway of the copyright lobby over the direction of copyright legislation).
210 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108
YALE L.J. 1687, 1698-99 (1999) (arguing that trademark dilution is applied without clear
limits or standards); Michael .). Schwarz, Note, Demonstrating the Requisite Level of Proof for a
Federal Trademark Dilution Claim: Establishing Actual Dilution Following Moseley v. Victoria's
Secret, 25 PACE L. Rev. 157, 174, 176 (2004) (arguing that the Supreme Court decision
does little to provide actual guidance as to what kinds of evidence is needed to prove ac-
tual dilution).
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lack the resources and expertise to engage in fine analysis of intellec-
tual property codes. This Article posits that the easiest way to arrive at
such certainty, while still balancing concerns of incentive and access,
is to take seriously the dynamic, communicative properties of the re-
source at issue and to tailor secondary use rights accordingly.
C. Consumer Psychology and Consumption
Consumers have interests on both sides of the secondary use de-
bate. Consumers choose between expressive goods at least in part based
on brand identity messages or cues from the work's owner."' Stable
brand and message identities allow for easy and convenient product
selection. The process of consuming the work, however, stimulates sub-
jective association, fantasy, and imagery. 272 These associations form part
of the significance of the work to the user. 273 Shared communication of
the experience of consumption helps to establish a social meaning of
the work that may be different from the meaning put forth by the
work's copyright owner. 274 These associations,' although stimulated by
and inextricably linked to the work, should not be considered part of
the original copyright owner's domain.
1. Choice
Consumer psychology research points to two principal aspects that
inform choice of entertainment, or "hedonic," materials: attention and
identity. Choice of any consumer product depends on audience atten-
tion and understanding, but these elements have the greatest impact
271 See DANIEL MILLER, MATERIAL CULTURE AND MASS CONSUMPTION 190-91 (1987);
see also John Deighton, The Interaction of Advertising and Evidence, 111 CONSUMER RES. 763,
764, 766 (1984) (demonstrating that advertising arouses initial expectations that consum-
ers try to confirm through experience with a product).
272
 MILLER, supra note 271, at 190-91 (discussing from an anthropological perspective
the process of transforming through consumption an alienable good to a cultural artifact
endowed with particular inseparable connotations); Elizabeth C. Hirschman & Morris B.
Holbrook, &dunk Consumption: Emerging Concepts, Methods and Propositions, 46 J. MARKET-
ING 92, 92 (1982).
2" See Hirschman & Holbrook, supra note 272, at 93-95.
274 C./ JEROME BRUNER, AcTs OF MEANING 12-13 (1990) (stating that culture is shared
and participatory; we depend on shared modes of discourse to negotiate the meaning and
interpretation of cultural objects); KATHERINE NELSON, MAKING SENSE: THE ACQUISITION
OF SHARED MEANING 249-51 (1985) (explaining that development of meaning is an inter-
active process that depends on internal interpretive systems, the context of the use, and
how the communication is interpreted within a given community).
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for hedonic goods because, unlike food or household staples, they have
no independent functions that would require purchase.
a. Attention
The most salient feature of the current information economy is
the sheer number of works competing for the attention of an audi-
ence. 275 Twenty years ago, producers of expressive goods faced a mar-
ketplace consisting of relatively "few outlets and essentially a captive
audience."276 A scarcity of informational product existed in the face of
mass demand. New methods of information distribution, such as tele-
vision, the Internet, and portable digital devices, have changed all
this. Information can reach us at our desks, at home, and as we travel
between the two. 277 We are also subject to an expanding volume of
media products. 278 This wealth of information creates a poverty of at-
ten tion. 279
A familiar text, work, or personality allows consumers to pick out
products of interest and tune out the rest. 280 Buying on the basis of
gut feelings about a product, such as a general positive attitude or
"liking" created by brand identity, saves consumers cognitive energy. 281
They can sidestep feelings of doubt and hesitancy that naturally result
from paying closer attention to any consumptive choice. 282
The importance of attention helps to explain the tenacity of par-
ody even in the tightly controlled proprietary marketplace. By placing
an older work in a new context, either in an advertisement or in a
product itself, producers offer familiarity and surprise, two elements
likely to captivate an audience. 283 In a consumer research study exam-
2" See WOLF, supra note 206, at 84.
276 Id. at 84-85.
277 See David W. Schumann, Media Factors That Contribute to a Restriction of Exposure to Di-
versity, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ENTERTAINMENT MEDIA: BLURRING THE LINES BETWEEN
ENTERTAINMENT AND PERSUASION, SUpra note 215, at 233, 242, 247.
278 According to one industry estimate, fifteen years ago the average adult saw or
heard 500-800 messages per day including television, radio, billboards. WOLF, supra note
206, at 256. In 1999, the number had more than tripled to 3000 per day. Id.
279 Sec WOLF, supra note 206, at 84.
263 Id. at 223 ("In today's environment, mind share—how well the public knows your
brand and cares about it—often precedes market share.").
281 USHAUGIINESSY & O'SLIAUGHNESSY, supra note 210, at 60.
2e2 Id.
183 See Rik Pieters et al., Breaking Through the Clutter: Benefits of Advertisement Originality
and Familiarity for Brand Attention and Memory, 48 Wrr. Sat. 765, 767, 777 (2002); see also
Yih Hwai Lee & Charlotte Mason, Responses to Information Incongruency in Advertising: The
Role of Expectancy, Relevancy and Human 261 CONSUMER Rm. 156, 156-57, 167-68 (1999)
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ining advertising effectiveness, researchers found that people spend
more time on and have greater memory for advertising messages that
use familiar elements in unfamiliar, unexpected ways. 284 Studies show
that humor also can increase a consumer's response to a message. 285
Humorous messages command more attention, but they also act "as a
distraction, disarming possible criticism."286 One way to view parody
then is as a device that fools consumers into paying attention to some-
thing they would ordinarily disregard.
This impact persists whether or not the secondary user is parody-
ing the work, using it to satirize something else or just trying generally
to get attention. The Supreme Court's distinction between productive
uses and uses just to get attention in this respect creates a false di-
chotomy. Every secondary user, parodist or not, will attract a greater
audience for a message by tying it to a well-known work than they
would by distributing the message alone. The problem is that every-
one cannot use expressive works at once. Symbols in the form of
characters, sounds, and images will cease to catch the attention of
consumers if they see or hear them everywhere. Consumers have an
interest in controlled use of branded properties so that they can allo-
cate their attention efficiently,
2. Identity
After awareness, consumer research suggests that the choice to
consume a given work depends on that work having some salient
meaning or symbolic value. 287 This is what Posner and Landes mean
when they argue that the transformation of Mickey Mouse from Dis-
(reporting that messages that presented relevant information in unexpected ways showed
higher recall and elicited more positive attitudes among potential consumers).
284
 Pieters, et al., supra note 283, at 773; see also THoMAs H. DAVENPORT & JOHN C.
BECK, THE ATTENTION ECONOMY: UNDERSTANDING THE NEW CURRENCY OF BUSINESS 195
exh.11-1 (2001) (finding that factors that attracted attention to email messages included
that the message concerned topics of personal interest and that the content was presented
in a new, unusual or unique way).
288 See Lee & Mason, supra note 283, at 168.
286 O'SHAUGHNEssY & O'SIIAUGHNESSY, supra note 210, at 132; Lee & Mason, supra
note 283, at 168.
287 See JANOS LASZLO, COGNITION AND REPRESENTATION IN LITERATURE: THE PSY-
cHoLoGY OF LITERARY NARRATIVES 96 (1999); Richard P. Bagozzi et al., The Role of Emo-
tions in Goal-Directed Behavior in THE WHY OF CONSUMPTION: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES
ON CONSUMER MOTIVES, GOALS, AND DESIRES 37, 50 (S. Ratneshwar et al. eds., 2000) (hy-
pothesizing that many consumer behaviors, such as seeing movies, are the result of antici-
pated emotions); Morris B. Holbrook & Elizabeth C. Hirschman, The Experiential Aspects of
Consumption: Consumer Fantasies, Feelings, and Fun, 9J. CONSUMER RES. 132, 138 (1982).
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ney's grinning spokescharacter to a raffish derelict or hen-pecked
husband will harm the value of the character himself. 288 Popular
characters, sounds and images provide useful information. We can
expend less effort choosing between films for example, if one is a se-
quel or derivative. We do not need to spend time and energy re-
searching the plot of the film; we know we are interested in the char-
acter or story.
Specifically, consumer research shows that we choose hedonic
goods based on the experience we think they will offer us. 289 Attrac-
tive qualities in expressive works include works that we think will be
transporting, that contain a character or storyline in which we would
like to envision ourselves, or that offer access to a desired group or
situation.299 In this way, most consumers interact with expressive
products not with the aim of transforming the product, but with the
desire to be transformed by the product. 291 For example, we tend to
choose to purchase music based on its ability to draw us in and offer
an absorbing experience. 2`J 2
Once again, secondary users benefit by defining their own work
in opposition to a previous one. Communicating a salient identity to
distracted consumers is difficult. Producers seeking to market to one
target segment can use existing goods as informational shortcuts. For
example, the popular Middle Eastern brand Mecca Cola is beloved
because it is marketed explicitly as an opportunity to reject American
imperialism in the form of the American brand standard Coca
268 See Landes & Posner, supra note 7, at 487-88.
28D See LASZLO, supra note 287, at 96 (1999); Bagozzi et al., supra note 287, at 50 (hy-
pothesizing that many consumer behaviors such as seeing movies are the result of antici-
pated emotions); Holbrook & Hirschman, supra note 287, at 138.
25° Russell W. Belk et al., The Missing Streetcar Named Desire, in THE WHY OF CONSUMP-
TION: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON CONSUMER MOTIVES, GOALS, AND DESIRES, SUpra
note 287, at 98, 112-14; Morris B. Holbrook et al., Using Versus Choosing: The Relationship of
the Consumption Experience to Reasons for Purchasing, 20 EUROPEAN J. MARKETING 49, 52, 57-
58 (1986) (finding that people buy novels and records more for social than utilitarian rea-
sons); cf. BRUNER, supra note 274, at 54 (stating that fiction draws us in by offering an am-
biguous array of vicarious possibilities that readers can "try on for fit"); Scott Jones et al.,
Marketing Through Sports Entertainment: A Functional Approach, in THE PSYCHOLOGY or EN-
TERTAINMENT MEDIA: BLURRING THE LINES BETWEEN ENTERTAINMENT AND PERSUASION,
supra note 215, at 309, 311-12 (stating that consumers watch sports as a way of aligning
themselves with a favored sports hero or property); William Chipps, Hitching Brands to the
Stars, BILLBOARD, Aug. 21, 2004, at 40 (noting that consumers want to purchase products
used, worn or touted by favorite celebrities).
291 Hughes, supra note 7, at 957.
292 Kathleen T. Lacher, Hedonic Consumption: Music as a Product, 16 ADVANCES IN CON-
SUMER RES. 367, 368, 371 (1989).
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Cola. 295
 The video game company that based a series of ads on blow-
ing up Lever's Snuggle fabric softener bear gained instant credibility
with adolescent male gamers. 294
 These products catch the eye of a tar-
get market by repurposing symbols of lifestyles, the cuddly safety of
childhood, or the brash consumerism of the United States, about
which their audience is ambivalent.
The same effects hold true when previous works are incorporated
into the work itself. The rap group 2 Live Crew identified itself as
dangerous, outside, and urban by reworking a nostalgic seventies
tune.295
 Alice Randall sent a message about the prominence of black
Americans in culture by upending the racial hierarchies in the origi-
nal Gone With the Wind, 295
 Each artist made their message more inter-
esting by framing it in terms of a text with which a significant part of
the audience was already invested.
Overuse or inconsistent use of such signifiers, however, ruins
their informative value and impedes their utility for audience
choice. 297
 The works themselves may be less desirable for consump-
tion if their meanings are altered. For example, music that has been
used for a variety of commercial purposes may cease to transport lis-
teners easily. Characters that act every which way will make poor vehi-
cles for individual fantasy. Overuse and widespread conflicting uses
may interfere with the ability of users effectively to choose works to
consume. Although owners may have no right to dictate the meaning
of their works to members of the audience, they do have some claim
to preserving the ability of audiences to choose to engage with their
works.
Others have argued that widespread use will have mostly positive
effects on audience desire and the value of individual works. 299 For
example, the value to me of seeing a certain film, The Aviator, say, in-
creases as more of my friends see it. Seeing the film then provides
not only temporary enjoyment, but a basis for connection and discus-
sion with a desired peer group. This is also true of scholarly works.
The value of this Article increases the more people who read it and
295 O'SlIAUGHNESSY & USHAUGHNESSY, supra note 210, at 88.
294
 See Conopco, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1148-49.
295
 See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. 569.
295 Sec generally Suntrust, 268 F.3d 1257.
297 Sec Hughes, supra note 7, at 942-43.
298 Stewart F.. Sterk, What's in a Name?: The Troublesome Analogies Between Real and Intellec-
tual I) operty 22 (Benjamin N. Cardozo Sch. of Law Jacob Burns Inst. for Advanced Legal
Studies, Working Paper No. 88, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/absract=57512L
299 See id.
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quote its ideas. Such positive externalities are termed "network ef-
fects."30° While this is a good argument for free dissemination of exact
copies of works, it is more complicated when it comes to derivatives.
The theory depends on my friends and me all having seen the same
version of The Aviator or we will have no basis for comparison. Net-
work effects fail if we cannot easily exchange information about our
shared experience.
To be sure, some derivatives do increase the value of originals.
Sales of books tend to increase after the release of film and DVD ver-
sions, for example."' In such cases, however, the derivative is com-
plementary to the original. It is unclear what the release of badly
made, offensive, or critical derivatives might have on consumer per-
ceptions of and desire for an original work. Furthermore, copyright
and other proprietary schemes ensure that only one authorized de-
rivative is released in each category. Without copyright, audiences
could be bombarded with multiple sequels to popular films, film ver-
sions of popular books, and commercials featuring characters from
each."2 The ubiquitous presence of multiple texts may decrease the
desirability of every part of the franchise even though individual uses
may have found an audience in isolation. Consumers will also have to
spend more time and energy sorting through competing messages,
something they may be unwilling to do when it comes to works cho-
sen for escapist, experiential reasons.
3. The Audience's Personal Use of Expressive Works
Once a consumer has access to a work or has it in his possession,
the relationship changes. Cultural works provide a variety of complex
and important functions for users. These experiences extend beyond
simple entertainment or desire to pass tirne. 503 Users engage with cul-
tural works as a way of projecting and exploring their idealized "true"
selves."4 Engagement with adventure and risks not present in daily
21" See Pessach, supra note 78, at 1085 (describing cultural network effects).
301 Sales of books from the Lord of the Rings trilogy shot up after the release of film
and DVD versions, for example. Amazon Sales Rank for Lord of the Rings, http://www.
amazon.com (search "Books" for "Lord of the Rings"; sort by "Bestselling"; select J.R.R.
Tolkien Boxed Set (The Hobbit and The Lord of the Rings) [BOX SET]"; then scroll
down to "Product Details").
902 See Abramowicz, supra note 125, at 5, 23.
9W See Holbrook & Hirschman, supra note 287, at 138; sec also Russell et al., supra note
215, at 275,'276 (listing reasons why people watch soap operas).
904 See Eric J. Arnould & Linda L. Price, Authenticating Acts and Authoritative Perform-
ances: Questing for Self and Community, in THE WHY OF CONSUMPTION: CONTEMPORARY PER-
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life allows for emotional release and fantasy," Such works also can
assist in acclimating to new situations or establishing cultural
norms." Watching a film about a painful situation, such as the di-
vorce in Kramer v. Kramel; can help individuals process difficult expe-
riences and painful emotions, for example." 7 The knowledge that
many others have experienced the same works can inform our sense
of appropriate reactions to novel situations." Even works of fashion
dictate rules of appearance that consumers can choose whether and
how to adopt."8 Cultural works also assist in defining and establishing
social networks.") Common consumption of the new hit show or
novel creates a shared experience."' In the absence of tightly knit
SPECTIVES ON CONSUMER MOTIVES, GOALS, AND DESIRES, supra note 287, at 140, 145; Rus-
sell et al., supra note 215, at 277; cf. BRUNER, supra note 274, at 33, 101 (stating that the self
is shaped in reference to cultural systems of interpretation).
505 Hirschman & Holbrook, supra note 272, at 96; see also Arnould & Price, supra note
309, at 150 (reporting that consumers of rafting trips gain self-assurance and confidence
through memories of the experience); Melanie C. Green et al., The Power of Fiction: Deter-
minants and Boundaries, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ENTERTAINMENT MEDIA: BLURRING THE
LINES BETWEEN ENTERTAINMENT AND PERSUASION, supra note 215, at 161, 169 (describing
how participants who felt transported into a story came to see characters as friends and
remembered narrated events as real).
5" See Maria Kn iazeva, Between the Ads: Effects of Nonadvertising TV Messages on Consump-
tion Behavior; in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ENTERTAINMENT MEDIA: BLURRING THE LINES BE-
TWEEN ENTERTAINMENT AND PERSUASION, supra note 215, at 213, 218, 220 (noting that
media sorts reality into meaningful social categories that consumers can use to interpret
their daily lives and can help to acculturate foreigners to new environments); cf. BRUNER,
supra note 274, at 68 (stating that human propensity to share stories and find interpreta-
tions within dominant moral and institutional schemes is one of the most powerful forms
of social stability).
567 Hirschman Be Holbrook, supra note 272, at 96.
505 See id.
509 Craig J. Thompson & Diana L. Haytko, Speaking of Fashion: Consumers' Uses of Fashion
Discourses and the Appropriation of Countervailing Cultural Meanings, 24 J. CONSUMER Res. 15,
15-16, 35-38 (1997); see also Jonathan M. Barnett, Shopping for Gucci on Canal Street:
Reflections on Status Consumption, Intellectual Property and the Incentive Thesis, 91 VA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 7-9, on file with author), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=704721.
510 See MILLER, supra note 271, at 209-10, 212; Hirschman & Holbrook, supra note 272,
at 99; Russell et al., supra note 215, at 279; cf. Arnould & Price, supra note 304, at 154-58
(arguing that certain acts of consumption, such as viewing or participating in Christmas
pageants, river-rafting trips, tourism, and football games, contribute to self-conception and
connection to community).
91t
	
WOLF, supra note 206, at 38 (finding increasingly common ground with family
and colleagues in shared entertainment experiences); Arnould & Price, supra note 304, at
154-55; Timothy C. Brock & Stephen D. Livingston, The Need for Entertainment Scale, in THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF ENTERTAINMENT MEDIA: BLURRING THE LINES BETWEEN ENTERTAINMENT
AND PERSUASION, supra note 215, at 255, 272 (concurring with Wolf).
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communities or shared rituals, expressive goods provide outlets for
interacting with others. 312
At the same time, the act of consuming a work alters its meaning
for the individual. When reading, watching a performance, or listen-
ing to'music, users not only process the sensory attributes of the work
itself, but also generate internal, multisensory imagery. 913 This can
include real memories triggered by association, fantastical imagery
inserting ourselves in or in relation to the work, and pure affective
arousal.314 In this way, consumers of a work encode their experience
of the work differently in memory.915 Users enhance their experience
of a work by sharing and contrasting their own consumptive experi-
ence with others. 516 Some claim that this ability to communicate and
share one's experience with the work is a crucial step in processing
and internalizing memory of the work." 7 At one extreme, people
strongly affected by experiences with expressive works may join fan
clubs, participate in fantasy reenactments, or create "fan fiction" in
the form of unauthorized derivatives." 8
Only a copyright zealot would suggest that an individual's experi-
ence of a text somehow belongs to the copyright owner. And yet,
many of the lawsuits surrounding secondary use of expressive works
312 See MILLER, supra note 271, at 215; Arnould & Price, supra note 304, at 140,141,
148-60; Kniazeva, supra note 306, at 218-21; Russell, et al., supra note 215, at 277. See gener-
ally Hirschman & Holbrook, supra note 272, at 92-97.
313 LASZLO, supra note 287, at 98; Hirschman & Holbrook, supra note 272, at 92-94.
314 See LASZLO, 51/p111 note 287, at 96-98; Athinodoros Chronis & Ronald D. Hampton,
Living in Another World: The Role of Narrative Imagination in the Production of Fantasy Enclaves,
31 ADVANCES IN CONSUMER RES. 193,193 (2004); Green et al., supra note 305, at 169.
313 See, e.g., WALTER KIN'ISCH, THE REPRESENTATION OF MEANING IN MEMORY 107-08,
115-16 (1974) (finding that representations are stored in memory on a semantic rather
than literal basis and individual memory of texts may differ based on differences in envi-
ronment and presentation). Cognitive research posits that people encode stories in the
form of schemas or scripts that assimilate the details of the story with preexisting knowl-
edge about its subject. ROBINSON-RIEGLER & ROBINSON-RIEGLER, supra note 29, at 464-65.
People's operative schemas, however, may differ depending on their place in the culture.
See BRUNER, supra note 274, at 64; LASZLO, supra note 287, at 103-07.
316 See Tushnet, supra note 100, at 545-46; see also BRUNER, supra note 274, at 13,33,68
(arguing that as cultural beings our way of life depends on shared meaning and concepts
which are negotiated through discourse about interpreting narratives and symbols); WOLF,
supra note 206, at 38 (entertainment products put people on the same wavelength and
"replace a sense of shared community"); Brock & Livingston, supra note 311, at 272 (con-
curring with Wolf).
312 See GILLESPIE, supra note 29, at 148 (arguing that memory and cognition are them-
selves participatory and that through imaginative reconstruction and critical reflection
with others we come to understand ourselves and our relationships); see also BRUNER, supra
note 274, at 33.
315 Russell et al., supra note 215, at 279; Tushnet, supra note 103, at 651-58.
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result from a user's attempt to communicate a subjective understand-
ing of the work to others. Alice Randall claimed that she wrote her
"parody" of Gone With the Wind as a way of "dealing with my response
to a text, portraying my response to a text:119 Her response was also
intended to communicate what she felt was a common view among
African-Americans explaining, "I think...the time has come for
America to understand how an African-American woman, and many
African-Americans, view the book that has influenced our country's
culture and how we view ourselves as a country." 329 Fans who "dress
up" as comic book characters online or who publish unauthorized
sequels or spin-offs are acting similarly."' These individuals are mak-
ing use of what is in some sense their own experience. It can be ar-
gued that the ability to enjoy the consumptive experience and share it
with others is what consumers believed they paid for when they
bought access to the work.
What is needed then is a theory that can preserve the audience's
ability to fully use expressive works while protecting at least some of
the identity that allows consumers to distinguish between works.
III. TOWARD A BALANCED TEST FOR SECONDARY USE
Contrary to the overgrazing paradigm in which all secondary uses
will equally undermine audience conceptions, cognitive research sug-
gests that all secondary uses do not impact audience members equally.
Although the dynamics of memory and perception are complicated,
four well-established doctrines may aid in drawing lines between intan-
gible entitlements and audience reuse rights. These are resistance, fre-
quency effects, source effects, and hierarchy of processing.
First, our general attitudes towards iconic works, which are most
often the subject of disputes, are resistant to change. We are more
likely to pay attention to works that conform to what we already be-
lieve and to discount works that conflict with our attitudes. 322 This
319 Interview by CNN with Alice Randall, ( June 22, 2001), http://archives.cnn.com/
2001 /SHOWBIZ/books/06/22/randall.cnna/.
329 Id.
321 For example, the designer of the City of Heroes game objected to by Marvel Com-
ics sought to 'make the experience of playing City of Heroes just like my childhood comic-
book experience" by allowing users to design their own fantasy superheroes based on ac-
tual comic book characters. Michael Lafferty, Cryptic's Jack Emmert Takes a Few Moments from
Polishing Issue 3 of City of Heroes to Talk About What Lies Ahead for Garners, PC GAMEZONE,
http://pc.gamezone.com/news/12_10_04_06_16PM.htm  (last visited Sept. 11, 2005); see
also Tushnet, supra note 103, at 657.
922 See Schumann, supra note 277, at 235.
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suggests that people attracted to "parodic" reworkings of texts already
share the attitude of the new version, while those who prefer the old
will disregard it.
Second, as we cannot possibly pay attention to all of the mes-
sages, content, and persuasion hurtling our way from multiple
sources, we use processing cues, or heuristics, to determine which
messages deserve attention and concentration. Several common
processing heuristics, such as source effects, frequency of exposure,
and level of processing effort, may help us to better delineate between
secondary uses that are likely to distort the identity of works for audi-
ences and those that will not. These processes can thus inform the
boundaries we draw around rights to expressive works.
1. Resistance
The first doctrine of relevance to secondary use is attitude resis-
tance. Consumer purchasing decisions are to some extent based on
attitudes. 323 We buy what we have a positive feeling toward and we
avoid what we dislike. 324 Once we have formed strong attitudes about
an object, we tend to resist change. 325 This may be because often cer-
tain attitudes are linked as part of an overall self-schema. 32° People
who live in big cities, for example, tend to prefer different cars,
clothes, political candidates, and cultural works than those from rural
areas. 327 Changing one's belief may call into question the entire self-
schema. 328 To avoid dissonance, we tend to ignore or discount mes-
sages that call our attitudes into question and we give greater atten-
tion to those that reinforce our beliefs. 32° The more familiar and rote
a perception or belief is, the less likely we are to alter it either con-
sciously or unconsciously through new information. 330 While this state
323 See Attu; H. EAGLY & SHELLY CIIAIKEN, THE PSYCHOLOGY Or ki-rrrunEs 216
(1993).
324 See Paul M. Herr & Russell H. Fazio, The Attitude-to•Behavior Process: Implications for
Consumer Behavior, in ADVERTISING EXPOSURE, MEMORY, AND CHOICE 119,131-32 (Andrew
A. Mitchell ed., 1993).
323 EAGLY & CHAIKEN, supra note 323, at 559; see Green et al., supra note 305, at 172—
73.
328 SCCSchurnann, supra note 277, at 234-35.
327 See generally JOHN SPERLING ET AL., THE GREAT DIVIDE: RETRO VS. ME'llt0 AMERICA
(2004).
328 EAGLY & C1IAIKEN, supra note 323, at 584-89; see Schumann, supra note 277, at 235.
329 EAGLY & CIIAIKEN, supra note 323, at 590-608.
33° James L. McGaugh, Emotional Activation, Neuromodulatory Systems, and Memory, in
MEMORY DISTORTION: How MINDS, BRAINS, AND SOCIETIES RECONSTRUCT THE PAST 255,
255 (Daniel L. Schacter ed., 1995); sec also Green et al., supra note 305, at 172-73 (noting
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of affairs may undercut the possibility of cultural dialogue through
reworkings of popular texts, it also suggests that as a practical matter
such reworkings may not . have much affect on overall audience per-
ception. People who have a long history of positive relations with a
work, such as an iconic novel like Gone With the Wind, are likely to dis-
count any information that might persuade them to change their atti-
tude.331 Those already ambivalent about the work and its portrayal of
race relations will enjoy seeing these problems exposed through a
work like Randall's Wind Done Gone. Similarly, people who love Dick
and Jane for their innocence will tend to ignore any negative conno-
tations from the suburban Yiddish version. Those who have always
found Dick and Jane a little saccharine and stiff will enjoy seeing the
duo confront a more dangerous world than they have been used to.
The newer works do not so much steal an audience from the original
as they allow a richer discussion for those so inclined. These works are
unlikely to chip away much at underlying attitudes about iconic origi-
nals because those attitudes are so rote and well-rehearsed. 332 Fur-
thermore, continued marketing and promotion of the original ver-
sions will only reinforce the strength of dominant consumer attitudes.
With newer works or ones that are not yet familiar, memory and
attitude is more vulnerable to change. Information to which we are
frequently exposed and of which we are often reminded is less suscep-
tible to distortion. 333 Newly formed perceptions, by contrast, are more
vulnerable to alteration by conflicting inforrnation. 334 These findings
support suggestions that newer works deserve greater protection than
more established ones. 335 Perhaps owners deserve an absolute protec-
tion from unlicensed commercial derivatives for one year following
publication, for example, with wider use permitted later,
2. Source Effects
Research on perception and memory also reveals that users proc-
ess messages differently depending on the source. With so many mes-
the strength of attitudes formed through experience of fiction, though also noting at least
one theory as to why those attitudes may be more vulnerable to counterpropaganda).
33' Cf. Schumann, supra note 277, at 235-36 (using studies in the sociology of media
consumption to argue that people restrict their exposure to dissonant media messages).
332 McGaugh, supra note 330, at 255-56.
"3 Id.
"4 Id. at 256,265.
335 See Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. Rev. 909,410 (2002)
(proposing a greater latitude of fair use for older works).
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sages clamoring for our attention, we decide which to pay attention to
partially based on the credibility or attractiveness of thesource. 338 A
source's credibility refers both to its perceived expertise on a topic and
its trustworthiness as a communicator. 337 Where consumers have little
attention or involvement with the subject of a message, as they might
with advertising or promotion of a new media product, they tend to
evaluate the message based on peripheral cues such as the message
source.338 They more readily accept information from a source per-
ceived as credible and discount information from sources perceived as
biased or untrustworthy. 338 For example, one experiment comparing
high to moderate credibility sources asked individuals to rank several
abstract modern poems based on use of alliteration." ) They were then
shown an article that identified the poem they ranked second to last as
a superior example of alliteration and were then asked to rank the po-
ems again.341 Those who were told that the article had been written by
"6 See DAVENPORT & BECK, supra note 284, at 195; Shelly Chaiken, Heuristic Versus Sys-
temic Information Processing and the Use of Source Versus Message Cues in Persuasion, 39 J. PER-
SONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 752, 753, 763 (1980) (finding that perceptions of a source's
expertise affected opinion of a message and hypothesizing that source cues affect opinion
change because they influence both attention to a message and predisposition to its con-
tent).
337 R. Glen Hass, Effects of Source Characteristics on Cognitive Responses and Persuasion, in
COGNITIVE RESPONSES IN PERSUASION, supra note 230, at 141, 143.
335Sce Shelly Chaiken & Durairaj Maheswaran, Heuristic Processing Can Bias Systemic Proc-
essing: Effects of Source Credibility, Argument Ambiguity, and Task Importance on Attitude Judg-
ment, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 460, 466, 469 (1994) (describing experiment
in which students evaluated an unfamiliar product based on descriptions from sources of
varying credibility); see aLSO RICHARD E. PETTY & Jour; T. CACIOPPO, COMMUNICATION AND
PERSUASION: CENTRAL AND PERIPHERAL RotrrEs TO ATTITUDE CHANGE 54, 142 (1986)
(finding that individuals with low involvement in subject matter are more likely to use
cognitively less taxing "peripheral processes" such as source expertise to evaluate the valid-
ity of a message).
'59 Chaiken & Maheswaran, supra note 338, at 464; Hass, supra note 337, at 154-55
(noting, however, an exception where the subject is already predisposed to believe in or
trust the opinion expressed); see also Paulette M. Gillig & Anthony G. Greenwald, Is It Time
to Lay the Sleeper Effect to Rest?, 29 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 132, 135 (1974) (not-
ing tendency to discount information from low credibility sources); Rochelle Lynn
Chaiken, The Use of Source Versus Message Cues in Persuasion: An Information Process-
ing Analysis 17-26 (Dec. 1977) (on file with the author) (summarizing research studies);
cf. Tulin Erdem & Joffre Swait, Brand Credibility, Brand Consideration, and Choice, 31 J. CON-
SUMER RES, 191, 192, 196-97 (2004) (finding, with some variation across product class and
individual expertise, that consumers are more likely to include high-credibility brands
than low-credibility brands in initial purchase consideration sets and to choose such
brands for purchase because highly credible brands have lower perceived risks and infor-
mation costs).
51k/ Hass, supra note 337, at 158.
311
764	 Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol. 46:705
T.S. Eliot were likely to change their opinion of the poem's merit. 342
Those who were told the article was written by a college student seeking
a teaching position in English were much less inclined to change their
opinion than the former group. 343
Source credibility effects can explain the phenomenon observed
by Tushnet and others that users seem not to mind unauthorized re-
workings of popular texts in the form of fan fiction or parody so long
as one "orthodox" version exists. 344
 It may be that consumers are per-
fectly capable of contextualizing reworkings of expressive texts if they
have sufficient information about the source. Those who prefer the
authorized version will stick with that; those looking to explore alter-
natives can do so freely so long as unauthorized versions are clearly
marked and do not contain misleading source information. 345 Thus,
works clearly identified as emanating from an unauthorized source,
either in a labeled "parody" work such as the Yiddish with Dick and
Jane book, or in the context of a sketch comedy show, for example,
should be expected to have less involuntary impact on consumer atti-
tudes than confusing or ambiguous secondary uses.
3. Frequency Effects
Frequency and repetition, by contrast, can confuse and exhaust
audiences. As noted above, after an initial level of familiarity, overexpo-
sure to a communication elicits boredom and dislike. 34° In a study of
attitudes towards television commercials, research demonstrated that
greater exposure to similar commercials decreased liking and positive
feelings both for the commercials and the products advertised. 347 Varia-
tions in the commercials designed to enhance attention had little ame-
342 Id,
343 Id.; see also J.P. Das et al., Understanding l'ersus Suggestion in the Judgment of Literary
Passages, 35 J. ABNORMAL & SOCIAL PSYCH OL. 547, 547-561 (1967).
344 See Tushnet, supra note 103, at 672-73; see also Goldberger, supra note 209, at 353
(noting anecdotal evidence that audiences do not mind inconsistencies across works so
long as one version is deemed official or canonical).
343 By "source" information, I do not mean that in the ordinary case a simple dis-
claimer of affiliation would suffice. As demonstrated in the trademark context, disclaimers
can enhance confusion by associating the defendant's goods directly with the plaintiff. See
Mitchell E. Raclin, Disclaimers as a Remedy for Trademark Infringement: Inadequacies and Alter-
natives, 76 TRADEMARK REP. 59, 65 (1986). In this context, ''source" would have to include
at a minimum (a) clear and conspicuous indication that the work is "unauthorized" and
(b) the identity of the new author if it is likely to be meaningful to consumers.
346 See supra notes 231-32 and accompanying text.
347 Calder & Stern thal, supra note 231, at 185.
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liorating effect. 348 Similar effects were found in another study using
non-commercial radio messages.349 Repeated exposure to a message
may also lead to involuntary changes in perception, even if the recipi-
ent initially discredited the source as not credible or biased."° In this
way, frequent exposure may override the efficacy of other informa-
tional cues such as source and so confuse consumers as to authorized
and illicit interpretations. 351 To avoid this aspect of "overgrazing," sec-
ondary uses most likely to distort audience perception should remain
subject to property remedies like an injunction. 352 These would include
mass media advertisements incorporating proprietary works and other
mass promotions of secondary works that reach audiences unbidden
and have the potential to distort audience memory for a work. 353 So,
for example, secondary use in pop-up ads, television advertising, flyers,
posters, and perhaps even pervasive forms of mass media distribution
such as general radio promotion for songs or wide release for films
would remain subject to injunction. Works which must be sought out to
be consumed such as books, plays, website parodies, or those that are
subject to small-scale distribution, such as casual emails, could not be
348 Id.
349 Cacioppo & Petty, supra note 231, at 99.
550 Sec Lynn Hasher et al., Frequency and the Conference of Referential Validity. 16 J. VERBAL
LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV. 107, 107-12 (1977) (noting that experiment subjects were
more likely to accept repeated statements about subjects such as politics, science and art as
true over similar non-repeated statements); see also Scott A. Hawkins & Stephen J. Hoch,
Low-Involvement Learning: Memory Without Evaluation, 19 J. CONSUMER RES. 212, 214 (1992)
(stating that consumers accept repeated and familiar messages as true without evaluating
the content of the message); Herbert E. Krugman, The Impact of Television Advertising:
Learning Without Involvement, PUB. OPINION Q. 349, 354 (1965); cf. Alice H. Eagly & Shelly
Chaiken, Attitude Strength, Attitude Structure and Resistance to Change, in ATTITUDE
STRENGTH: ANTECEDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES 413, 427 (Richard E. Petty & Jon A. Kros-
nick eds., 1995) ("[W] ell-documented successes in changing strong attitudes have involved
bombarding the targeted people with a large amount of information consistent with the
desired attitude(s)."); Sawyer, supra note 230, at 254 (observing that although initial re-
sponses to obviously manipulative messages may be negative, repeated exposure to the
messages may allow for dissipation of the negative responses and subsequent re-evaluation
of the message based on quality and believability of the message).
351 Sec Kathryn A. Braun, Postexperience Advertising Effects on Consumer Memory, 25 J. CON-
SUMER RES. 319, 332 (1999) (finding that consumers may confuse the true nature of prod-
uct experience with a subsequent ad-induced description of it).
352 Cf. id. at 321, 332-33 (finding that subsequent misinformation can alter beliefs
without producing a conscious sense of confusion); Gavan Fitzsimons et al., Non-Conscious
Influences on Consume?. Choice, 13 MARKETING LETTERS 269, 273 (2002) (same).
353 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 580 n.14 (1994) (suggesting that
works with "wide dissemination" are more likely to substitute for the original than works
with "minimal distribution"). See generally Braun, supra note 351.
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enjoined. Owners would thus retain strong property boundaries against
the most harmful types of secondary use.
4. Hierarchy of Processing
A fourth theory relevant to this area is research postulating high
and low systems of cognitive processing. This research argues that in-
dividuals process certain types of information using more or less cog-
nitive effort. 354
 Systemic processing involves relatively high degrees of
attention and logical processing of message content. 355
 By contrast, we
use low-involvement processing for messages that seem unimportant,
trivial or when we lack sufficient attention or expertise to logically
evaluate the subject matter.356
 In low-involvement processing, we use
cues such as source or familiarity to determine our attitude toward
the communication and we tend to ignore the details of precise in-
formation contained in the message. 357 For this reason, low-
involvement messages can actually have greater unconscious impact
on our attitudes.358
 Although we have not consciously evaluated the
truth or credibility of such messages, they remain stored in memory
and may unconsciously impact our opinions and desires the next time
we consider a topic related to that message. 359
 So, for example, when
we see an advertisement describing Morton Salt as "easy to pour," we
do not really pay attention, but we store a few bits of information
from the ad without any conscious elaboration. 36° Over time, and with
repeated exposure, Morton Salt becomes associated in our minds with
"easy to pour."361
The theory has relevance for secondary use because certain types
of expressive works tend to be processed along one path or the other.
Depth of processing to some degree depends on individual goals in
354 See, e.g., PETTY & CACIOPPO, supra note 338, at 59; Chaiken & Maheswaran, supra
note 338, at 460.
335
 Chaiken & Maheswaran, supra note 338, at 460; Chaiken, supra note 336, at 752.
358
 PETIT & CACIOPPO, supra note 338, at 54; Chaiken & Maheswaran, supra note 338,
at 460; Chaiken, supra note 336, at 752; Hawkins & Hoch, supra note 350, at 213.
357 Chaiken Be Maheswaran, supra note 338, at 460; see Parry & CACIOPPO, supra note
338, at 54; Hawkins & Hoch, supra note 350, at 214.
358 Hawkins & Hoch, supra note 350, at 213-14; Krugman, supra note 350, at 354.
359
 Hawkins & Hoch, supra note 350, at 213-14; see also ROBERT HEATn, THE HIDDEN
POWER OF ADVERTISING: How Low INVOLVEMENT PROCESSING INFLUENCES THE WAY WE
CHOOSE BRANDS 95 (2001) (noting that a marketing campaign that promoted the "re-
freshment" aspect of Heineken contributed to consumers subconsciously associating Hei-
neken with the concept of refreshment).
36° Hawkins & Hoch, supra note 350, at 214.
361 Id.
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approaching a type of communication. 362 Those actively seeking in-
formation about an imminent decision are more likely to use systemic
processing than those seeking diversion or pleasure. 365 Certain types
of works, however, are susceptible to generalization. Longer literary
works, for example, demand greater cognitive involvement regardless
of individual goals. 364 Quick and simple images such as cartoons or
catchy melodies, on the other hand, are more likely to receive heuris-
tic processing.565 Although knowledge about a source may lead us to
discount such works when they emanate from authors other than the
original and so blunt their impact, this effect may be incomplete. 368 If
we want to provide maximum protection to copyright owners, then we
would want to be more concerned with likely low-involvement proc-
essing works than with dramatic or literary works that demand more
sustained cognitive attention. In this respect, the older copyright acts,
which provided for different bundles of rights depending on the type
of work, may have more internal logic than the current system of
mostly uniform rights.
5132 EAGLY & CHAIKEN, supra note 323, at 330.
363 Sep Richard E. Petty, John T. Cacioppo, and David W. Schumann, Central and Penph-
eral Routes to Advertising Effectiveness: The Moderating Role of Involvement, 101 CONSUMER RES.
135, 138 (1983); Richard C. Vincent & Michael D. Basil, College Students' News Gratifications,
Media Use and Current Events Knowledge, 41 J. BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 380,
380-89 (1997) (college students approaching graduation consumed all types of media
more instrumentally to gain knowledge about the world they were about to enter).
554 See, e.g., EYSENCK, supra note 29, at 77-78 (tasks that involve processing of meaning
receive greater depth of processing); Fergus I.M. Craik & Robert S. Lockhart, Levels of Proc-
essing: A Framework for Memory Research, 11 J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAVIOR 671,
680 (1972) (hypothesizing that tasks that require analysis of meaning of words lead to
greater memory retention due to greater depth of processing required by semantic elabo-
ration as opposed to syntactic or structural judgments).
555 Cf. Hawkins & Hoch, supra note 350, at 223 (advertisers prefer jingles and rhymes
because they increase memory without stimulating elaborative processing). Ease of con-
sumption is a general motivating factor for low-involvement consumers. See id.
566 For example, some studies have found a "sleeper effect" for messages from low
credibility sources. Darlene B. Hannah & Brian Sternthal, Detecting and Explaining the Sleeper
Effect, 11 J. CONSUMER RES. 632, 632 (1984). Although such messages are initially dis-
counted, over time listeners may retain the information while forgetting its source, leading
them to gradually accept the message over time. Id. Other studies, however, have failed to
replicate this affect, or have found it to be very limited. Gillig & Greenwald, supra note
339, at 138-39.
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5. Implications for judicial Analysis of Secondary Use Under
Copyright
The virtue of adopting an analysis based on consumer choice is
to remove analysis of artistic meaning from the judicial sphere and to
provide clearer rules to secondary users and to owners. Judges are not
well-equipped by training or experience to arbitrate over the objective
meaning of cultural works. They can, however, with relative ease de-
termine whether a work is old or new, whether source information is
present, whether a message has been mass-advertised or otherwise
pushed on large segments of the audience, or whether a work is a
book or a poster. In this way, judges need not learn the underlying
science to incorporate insights from cognitive research as well as eco-
nomics. Such an analysis would also provide secondary users with
more certainty by providing a clearer indication of works that cannot
be enjoined.
Judges could easily incorporate this analysis within the existing
fair use framework. The fourth factor under the current fair use test
asks judges to determine the effect of the secondary work on the
market for the original.367 No standards currently exist by which to
measure market harm. Although many have argued that only uses
that substitute for the original in the market should count, wide-
spread licensing of expressive works challenges our definition of what
the "market" should be. Is it only uses for which the owner has already
licensed the original? Uses that the owner might want to license in the
future?368 Or, as many owners argue, any use that lowers the licensing
value of the brand more generally? The above rules directly address
the issue of harm to expressive value, and allow judges a cleaner
framework for adjudicating the fourth factor in secondary use
cases. 369 Such a test would remove the need for a special "parody" ex-
367 Campbell. 510 U.S. at 590.
363 See Goldstein, supra note 65, at 232-34 for an argument in favor of this broader
definition.
No9
 As an alternative, such factors could be used to frame a more contextual inquiry
into "substantial similarity" between an original and a derivative work. Because these fac-
tors help distinguish between uses that consumers will find confusing and those that they
will contextualize effectively, they are relevant to the question of what kinds of unauthor-
ized derivative works overstep the boundary between permissible conjuring of an original
work and impermissible "copying" of that work. See Laura G. Lape, The Metaphysics of the
Law: Bringing Substantial Similarity Down to Earth, 98 Dtcx. L. REV. 181, 194-202 (1994)
(arguing generally that a finding of substantial similarity should depend on likelihood of
harm to the owner's incentive to create). These factors might also be useful in more nar-
rowly defining trademark uses that potentially 'dilute" older marks.
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ception except perhaps in the relatively rare cases where artists seek to
mass disseminate a commercial parody to an involuntary audience.
Proponents of secondary use might argue that restrictions on
methods of promotion or types of work unfairly burden an important
type of expression and interfere with its finding an audience. To the
extent that restrictions on dissemination and advertisement burden
secondary works, this is not necessarily a bad thing. The disadvantage
of allowing greater personal and commercial use of popular copy-
righted works is that it becomes cheaper to obviously piggyback on
existing works than to create more original texts. 3" In an attention
economy, works positioned off of popular brands will have an easier
time getting attention and establishing a personality relative to con-
sumer expectations. Limits on advertising and methods of distribu-
tion may help to remedy this imbalance and ensure sufficient invest-
ment in more original works. Compulsory license fees or actions for
profit allocation, such as Netanel's or Rubenfeld's schemes, may also
be appropriate in certain commercial contexts. 371
CONCLUSION
Copyright's cognitive elements have gone unexamined for too
long in favor of an analysis grounded in real property theory. Rules
based on pastures and cattle have limited force when applied to rights
in information. A more explicit grounding of copyright principles in
the mechanics of human cognition, similar to the types of analysis
commonplace under trademark law, provides a better balance be-
tween rights of owners and needs of users. In many ways, such a the-
ory is no more controversial than suggesting that the fee simple estate
in real property conform to the known dynamics of physical space.
Courts once considered air rights part of a landowner's domain. 372
This definition changed when air traffic increased the social value of
public air space to the point where it outweighed the private need for
such rights. 373 Similarly, the copyright owner's estate may be narrowed
to account for valuable expressive uses that do not do much harm to
the reproduction and distribution rights meant to be reserved to the
owner. Acknowledgement of copyright's conceptual underpinnings
3" I do not mean to assert that many or most cultural works do not borrow extensively
from previous forms and texts, but just to suggest that gradations in originality and obvi-
ousness of borrowing exist.
"1 See supra notes 123-124 and accompanying text.
972 BLACKSTONE, supra note 137, at *18.
375 See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946).
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thus allows for compromise between the competing economic and
free speech models of secondary use.
